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The chimera was a mythological creature with a lion 's head,
goat's body, and serpent's tail. Because of recent advances in
biotechnology, such permutations on species are no longer the stuff of
myth and legend The term "chimera " has come to describe a class of
genetically engineered creatures composed of some cells from one
species, which thus contain genetic material derived entirely from
that species, and some cells from another species, containing only
genetic material from that species. Scientists have created a goat-
sheep chimera or "geep" which exhibits physical characteristics of
both animals. Likewise, scientists have also used the tools of modern
molecular biology to create human-animal chimeras containing both
human and animal cells. While none of the human-animal chimeras
hitherto created have exhibited significant human characteristics, the
synthesis of human-animal chimeras raises significant ethical
concerns. The advent of human-animal chimera technology naturally
raises the issue of whether development of human-animal chimeras
should be encouraged by the issuance of patents to inventors of
human-animal chimeras.
This article explores the patentability of human-animal
chimeras. First, it surveys the law governing the patentability of
living things. Prior to the 1970s, the courts evinced great hostility to
the patentability of living things. However, courts became more
amenable to the patentability of living things and have held that
manmade living things, such as microorganisms, plants, and animals,
that do not appear in nature are patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Although the federal courts have never passed on the
patentability of human-animal chimeras or other forms of human
inventions, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
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indicated that human inventions are unpatentable and rejected an
application claiming certain human-animal chimeras because the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed chimeras
encompassed a human being. Furthermore, although Congress has
failed to expressly exclude human beings from the scope of patentable
subject matter under § 101, Congress has restricted the patentability
of human organisms through its appropriations power by enacting the
Weldon Amendment that proscribed the use offederal funds provided
for the operation of the PTO for the issuance of patents on human
organisms. However, no statutory or constitutional source provides a
definition for humanity despite the obvious importance of one in the
human-animal chimera context. This article also evaluates various
proposed standards for a chimera to qualify as human and concludes
that the preferred standard that best reflects moral, intuitional, and
biological conceptions of humanity classifies an organism as human
if it is characterized by the higher mental faculties and physical
characteristics associated with human beings to a significant degree.
Under the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of § 101 in
holding living things patentable, indicating that anything made by
man is patentable subject matter, human-animal chimeras, including
those considered human, as well as other human inventions are
patentable subject matter. Despite Congress's apparent attempt to
foreclose the patentability of human inventions using its
appropriations power, analysis of the patent law and the Weldon
Amendment and its legislative history indicates that Congress did not
intend to create a conflict with § 101 's broad scope of patentable
subject matter when it enacted the Weldon Amendment. Thus, a court
would likely hold that the Amendment did not completely foreclose
patentability of human inventions. Likewise, a patent for a human
invention does not run afoul of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Furthermore, human-animal chimeras satisfy the patent
law's utility requirement inasmuch as they have practical utility and
would not be found unpatentable under the moral utility doctrine.
Similarly, the patent law doctrines of novelty and nonobviousness do
not foreclose the patentability of human-animal chimeras. Therefore,
at least some human-animal chimeras may be patentable under some
circumstances, and this universe of potentially patentable human-
animal chimeras may include chimeras that are considered human.
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INTRODUCTION
In Greek mythology, the chimera was a monster that breathed
fire and had a lion's head, goat's body, and serpent's tail.' While this
creature remains a thing of myth and legend, recent advances in
biotechnology have allowed scientists to create permutations of
species that are eerily similar to the mythological chimera. 2 Today,
the term "chimera" is used to describe one of these permutations. The
precise nature of a chimera is most readily explained by comparing it
to the hybrid, a more commonly known biotechnological invention.
3
A hybrid is the result of a genetic cross between a male of one species
and a female of another. 4Accordingly, "every cell in a hybrid animal
contains one set of chromosomes from one species and one set from
another." 5 Thus, 50% of the genetic material in each cell of a hybrid,
and accordingly 50% of the genetic material of the entire hybrid
animal, is derived from one species while the other 50% is derived
from another species. In a chimera, the genetic material of the two
species used to engender the creature does not mix in the same cell.6
Rather, a chimera is composed of some cells from one species, which
contain genetic material derived entirely from that species, and some
cells from another species containing only genetic material from that
species.7 Thus, the cells in a chimeric animal always remain
segregated by species, and no cell contains genetic material from both
species. 8 For instance, the brain of a human-chimpanzee chimera
might contain some human neurons and some chimpanzee neurons,
but none of the neurons would contain both human and chimpanzee
genetic material. 9
One method of creating chimeras entails collecting embryos
from recently impregnated females of each species to be represented
in the chimera at the eight-cell-stage of development.' 0 The embryos
are combined by a grafting procedure where the two embryos, one of
1. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 443, 443 (1999).
2. Id.





8. Id. at 445 n.17.
9. Id. at 445.
10. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 1225-26 (4th ed.
2002); Magnani, supra note 1, at 446.
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each species to be represented in the chimera, are pushed together and
fuse when they are incubated at 37'C. 1 The fused embryo begins to
grow and divide in vitro as one embryo. 12 When the embryo reaches
the blastocyst stage of development, it is implanted into the womb of
a pseudopregnant female, a naturally impregnated pregnant female
from which the naturally created embryo has been surgically
removed, of one of the species present in the chimera.' 3 This female
serves as a surrogate mother for the chimeric animal as it develops
and is born naturally.' 4 The chimeric animal contains some cells that
are derived from each species used to engender it and thus displays
characteristics of both animals. This embryo fusion technique was
first successfully used in 1984 when scientists created a goat-sheep
chimera or "geep."'' 5 Parts of the "geep" derived from the goat portion
of the chimeric embryo were hairy, and those that grew from the
sheep portion were wooly.
16
The embryo fusion technique is not the only method that
researchers employ to create chimeras. For instance, chimeras can
also be generated by injecting stem cells of one species into an
embryo, fetus, or even a newborn of another species.1 7 However,
chimerism in chimeras created by this method is of a lesser extent
than in those created by the fusion method, and cells derived from the
injected cells are usually restricted to certain organs and/or are present
in small numbers.' 8 Furthermore, the simplest and oldest technique
11. See, e.g., ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 10, at 1225. As the chimera is the result of the
fusion of two embryos of different species, each with parents of the same species, a chimera can
be said to have four parents, two of each species present in the chimera. In contrast, a hybrid has
two parents, one of each species present in the chimera.
12. See id.; Magnani, supra note 1, at 446.
13. SeeALBERTSETAL.,supranote 10, at 1225; Magnani, supra note 1, at 446.
14. See ALBERTS ET AL.,supra note 10, at 1225.
15. See Sabine Meinecke-Tillmann, Experimental Chimaeras-Removal of Reproductive
Barrier Between Sheep and Goat, 307 NATURE 637 (1984); Carole B. Fehilly et al.,
Interspecifc Chimaerism Between Sheep and Goat, 307 NATuRE 634 (1984).
16. See Meinecke-Tillmann, supra note 15; Fehilly et al., supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., John Rennie, Human-Animal Chimeras, ScI. AM., June 27, 2005,
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=human-animal-chimeras; Maryann Mott, Animal-Human
Hybrids Spark Controversy, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 25, 2005,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/01/0125_050125_chimeras.html; Rick Weiss,
Of Mice, Men and In-Between, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at Al; Sylvia Pagdn Westphal,
Growing Human Organs on the Farm, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 20, 2003, at 4; Magnani, supra
note 1, at 446.
18. See, e.g., Westphal, supra note 17 at 4.
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for generating a chimera is xenotransplantation, the transplantation of
organs from one species to another. 9
Prior to the advent of modem molecular biology, humans created
human-animal chimeras inasmuch as clinical xenotransplantation has
long been used for medical treatment.20 For instance, pig and cow
heart valves are used to replace faulty human heart valves.2' Formally
speaking, such a surgery makes the recipient a chimera, although
nobody would seriously dispute that the recipient is anything other
than human.
22
Scientists have also used the tools of modem molecular biology
to create human-animal chimeras of the types discussed above. In
2003, Chinese scientists created human-rabbit chimeric embryos.
23
The embryos were allowed to develop for several days in a laboratory
dish before the scientists destroyed them to harvest their stem cells for
research purposes. 24 Also, a human-sheep chimera was created by
injecting a sheep fetus with human stem cells half-way though
gestation, too early for the animal's immune system to have
developed to reject the human cells, but after the animal's body plan
had formed.2 5 Thus, the resulting animals look like normal sheep
rather than strange chimeras having the physical characteristics of
both species such as the "geep," which are created by embryo fusion
at an early stage before either embryo develops a body plan.26
However, these sheep have human cells in some organ systems and
have livers that are 7 to 15% human. 7 Scientists have created other
human-animal chimeras, including pigs with human blood formed by
injecting human blood-forming cells into pig fetuses and mice with
brains containing 1% human cells by injection of human neural stem
cells into the brains of fetal or newborn mice.2 8 Research is currently
under way at Stanford University to create a mouse with an entirely
19. See, e.g., Bratislav Stankovi6, Patenting the Minotaur, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 6
(2005), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl2i2/article5.pdf.
20. See id.




25. Westphal, supra note 17, at 4.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See Mott, supra note 17.
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human brain by injecting human neural stem cells into mouse
embryos.
29
The synthesis of human-animal chimeras creates significant
ethical dilemmas. On one hand, human-animal chimeras have the
potential to create great benefits for the human race. They may
become valuable sources of organs for transplantation into humans as
a human is less likely to reject a chimeric organ than an animal
organ.30 Furthermore, chimeras will be useful in research as models
for studies on human embryonic development and on the effects of
pharmaceutical agents on humans. 31 Despite the potential benefits of
this technology to human health, human-animal chimera research
raises legitimate ethical concerns. Some consider any research
involving manipulation of human embryos morally wrong, and
chimera research may lead to needless human and animal suffering
stemming from both research and potential deformities resulting from
chimerism. 32 This point is especially important with regard to
chimeras that have enough human genetic material or characteristics
to qualify as human. These chimeras would receive heightened legal
rights and protections, and it would be fantastic to believe that
scientists could compel a chimera that was predominately human,
such as a xenotransplant recipient, to involuntarily act as a research
subject. Some people also raise a religious objection to synthesis of
chimeras, arguing that the creation of new types of animals should
only be the province of God.33 Still others argue that the creation of
chimeras violates the rights of human and animal species to exist in
an uncorrupted manner and denigrates humanity by commingling
human and animal organisms.34 Finally, there is much debate over the
standard for determining whether a chimera is sufficiently human to
constitute a human being entitled to the legal rights extended to
humans both in terms of the factors considered in assessing the
humanity of an organism and the degree of humanity required for an
organism to be classified as human.
35
29. Id.
30. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 456. Depending on the division of cells between each
species in the chimera, it is possible that some organs in a human-animal chimera could consist
entirely of human cells.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 457.
33. See Stankovid, supra note 19, at 31.
34. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 457.
35. See infra Part II.A.
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As chimera research continues, the courts and Congress will
have to determine whether they should encourage development of
chimeras by permitting the creators of human-animal chimeras to
obtain patents for them, thus allowing the creators to assert exclusive
rights to make and use the chimeras. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
36
the Supreme Court held that living things created by man that do not
occur in nature are patentable subject matter in the recombinant
microorganism context.37  This holding has subsequently been
extended to multicellular organisms such as plants and animals.
38
Human-animal chimeras are living things that do not occur in nature
and are created by man, and nothing in the language of any opinions
addressing the patentability of living things suggests that human-
animal chimeras or even non-naturally occurring fully-human
organisms, such as transgenic humans, are not patentable.
Nonetheless, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
rejected the first and only patent application for a human-animal
chimera reasoning that it encompassed a human and that human
organisms are not patentable subject matter.39 Furthermore, Congress
has used its appropriations power to prohibit the PTO from using
federal funds for the issuance of patents on human organisms,
seemingly foreclosing their patentability. 40 However, Congress failed
to define human organisms and thus did not articulate a standard for
determining whether a particular chimera is sufficiently human to
constitute a human.
This Article explores the patentability of human-animal
chimeras.41 Part I traces the evolution of the treatment of the
patentability of living things by the courts and the PTO. It also
describes the PTO's handling and rejection of an application for a
patent for a human-animal chimera and Congressional action related
to the patentability of human-animal chimeras. Part II analyzes the
36. Diamondv. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
37. Id. at 309.
38. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Ex
parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987); Ex parte Hibberd, et al., 227 U.S.P.Q. 443
(B.P.A.I. 1985).
39. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 129-30 (4th ed. 2007).
40. See infra Part I.E.
41. This article is restricted in scope to product claims for the human-animal chimera
itself. Process claims for making human-animal chimeras do not raise the complex issues
relating to the patenting of humanity. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 450. These claims are
patentable if they meet the statutory requirements for patentability including novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility.
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patentability of human-animal chimeras and related human
inventions. Part II initially examines the confusion surrounding the
definition of humanity to be applied in the chimera context and
concludes that the definition which best reflects modem conceptions
of humanity is one that considers a chimera that possesses significant
human cognitive and physical characteristics human. Then, it explores
the patentability of human-animal chimeras in light of the Patent Act
and case law interpreting it. First, it concludes that under conventional
patent law, human-animal chimeras, even those chimeras considered
human, constitute patentable subject matter. Second, given this
conclusion, Part II suggests that Congress's withholding of federal
funds from the PTO for the issuance of human patents does not
necessarily foreclose the patentability of chimeras considered human.
Third, Part II examines whether the rights conferred by the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments proscribe the patentability of human-
animal chimeras considered human and determines they do not.
Finally, Part II concludes that the statutory patentability requirements
of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness may be met in the human-
animal chimera context. Thus, it appears that at least some human-
animal chimeras are patentable.
I. PATENTABILITY OF LIVING THINGS
The scope of patentable subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. §
101.42 In order to be eligible for patent protection, an invention must
fall within one of the statutory categories of process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.43 Congress deliberately
crafted these categories to be broad, and they seldom pose an obstacle
to an inventor's endeavors to patent his invention.44 However, the
Supreme Court has determined that certain categories of invention or
discovery, including laws of nature, products of nature, physical or
natural phenomenon, abstract ideas, and unapplied mathematical
42. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor . .
43. Id.
44. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 23 (1999); see also S. REP. No. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952) (stating that patents are available for "anything under the sun that is made by
man"); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (also stating that patents are available for "anything
under the sun that is made by man").
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algorithms, exceed the statutory boundaries of patentable subject
matter.45
This Part surveys the treatment of the patentability of living
things by courts and the PTO. First, it describes the situation prior to
the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Chakrabarty. Second, this Part
explores the Chakrabarty Court's reasoning in holding that manmade
microorganisms that do not occur in nature are patentable. Third, this
Part traces the extension of this holding to multicellular organisms,
such as plants and animals, by courts and the PTO. Fourth, the PTO's
rejection of a patent for human-animal chimeras is examined. Finally,
this Part describes the role Congress has hitherto taken in regulating
the patentability of chimeras.
A. Historical Treatment of the Patentability of Living Things
In 1873, the PTO issued the first American patent for a living
thing to Louis Pasteur for purified yeast as an article of manufacture
under § 101.46 However, prior to Chakrabarty, patents for living
organisms independent of their use, such as the one issued to Pasteur,
were very much an anomaly.47 The PTO and the courts almost
45. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (relating cases where
certain categories of invention were deemed unpatentable subject matter); JANICE M. MUELLER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 234 (2d ed. 2006).
46. U.S. Patent No. 141,072 (filed May 9, 1873).
47. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property
Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 95 (1995). In 1937, a leading commentator opined
that Pasteur's patent would be refused because it did not cover patentable subject matter. See
P.J. Frederico, Louis Pasteur's Patents, 86 SCI. 327 (1937). The only other examples of patents
for living things, independent of their use, issued by the PTO prior to 1980, identified in the case
law and literature, are two patents claiming living microorganisms issued in 1967 and 1969. See,
e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314 n.9. However, while the PTO and lower courts refused to
permit patents for living organisms themselves, they repeatedly permitted patents for
compositions containing living things and processes utilizing them. See, e.g., Milwaukee v.
Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 578 n.1 (7th Cir. 1934) (recognizing a patent for a septic
tank utilizing bacteria); Union Solvents Corp. v. Guar. Trust Co., 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932)
(upholding a patent for a bacterial process used in the synthesis of alcohol); Cameron Septic
Tank Co. v. Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding a patent claiming a
septic tank using anaerobic bacteria valid). However, courts have long held that biological
substances purified from living things were patentable because they did not exist in a purified
form in nature. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103, 115
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). This reasoning was extended to purified microorganism cultures much
later as such purified cultures of microorganisms do not exist in nature and are manmade as they
can only be produced under carefully controlled laboratory conditions. See In re Bergy, 563
F.2d 1031, 1035-37 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub noam. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978)
(mem.), affd on remand sub nom. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Naturally occurring higher plants and animals,
such as human beings and human-animal chimeras, are "large enough that their identification
60 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1.J. [Vol. 25
invariably rejected patents that pertained to living organisms
regardless of whether the organism is found in nature in the form
claimed or not.48 These rejections were based on one of two grounds:
(1) considering living things unpatentable products of nature under
the product of nature doctrine, which excludes products of nature
from the realm of patentable subject matter;4 9 and (2) rejecting the
idea that living things are patentable subject matter under § 101
because Congress provided for plant patents separately in the 1930
Plant Patent Act 50 and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act,
5
'
apparently indicating that plants and other living things were not
covered by § 101 and that Congress intended for plants covered by
these statutes to be the only living things afforded intellectual
property protection.5 2
B. Diamond v. Chakrabarty-Patentability of Microorganisms
as Living Subject Matter
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court directly addressed the
question of whether living things that did not occur in nature
themselves were patentable subject matter. The patentee created a
genetically engineered bacterium capable of degrading crude oil by
introducing certain plasmids harboring genes that confer the ability to
break down multiple components of crude oil into a naturally
occurring strain of bacteria which had no capacity to degrade crude
oil.53 The Court held that a living non-natural microorganism is
patentable subject matter under § 101.54 Also, the Court noted that, in
choosing terms such as "manufacture" and "composition of matter,"
and isolation does not require a scientist's ingenuity in developing experimental culture
conditions." Mark L. Rohrbaugh, The Patenting of Extinct Organisms: Revival of Lost Arts, 25
AIPLA Q.J. 371, 385 (1997). Thus, a higher organism may only be patentable if the organism
itself results from the application of human ingenuity and effort rather than from the routine
cultivation of a free-living organism. See id; see also infra Part I.C.
48. See, e.g., Scalise & Nugent, supra note 47, at 95.
49. See Valerie J. Phillips, Half-Human Creatures, Plants & Indigenous Peoples:
Musings on Ramifications of Western Notions of Intellectual Property and the Newman-Ri/kin
Attempt to Patent a Theoretical Half-Human Creature, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 383 (2005).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
51. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000).
52. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 47, at 95; see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309
(indicating that products of nature are unpatentable).
53. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. Plasmids are circular pieces of DNA which encode
bacterial genes and function as hereditary units that are physically separate from the bacterial
chromosome. Id. at 305 n.l.
54. Seeid. at318.
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Congress contemplated that patent laws be given wide scope based on
the common usages of these terms.5 This was consistent with the
legislative history of the Patent Act indicating that "Congress
intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun
that is made by man.' 6 For instance, the Court adopted a broad
definition of "manufacture" as an article produced "for use from raw
or prepared materials by giving these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by
machinery."5 7 Similarly, the Court defined "composition of matter" to
include "all compositions of two or more substances and ... all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or
solids."5 8 The genetically engineered bacterium in the case plainly
met both of these definitions as it had different properties than the
naturally occurring bacterium, which served as a raw material in its
production, and it was a composition of the original bacterium and the
plasmids. Thus, the Court concluded that the bacterium was
patentable subject matter because it was a non-naturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter-"a product of human
ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character, [and] use' from the
natural bacterium from which it was synthesized5 9
In addition, the Court distinguished Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.,60 where it rejected the patentability of a mixture
of naturally occurring bacteria used by farmers for their natural ability
to help plants fix nitrogen.6 1 The Funk Bros. Court reasoned that the
patentee did not create any new bacteria and, when mixed together,
the bacteria performed the same function they performed in nature.
62
In contrast, the genetically engineered bacterium at issue in
Chakrabarty was a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any bacterium appearing in nature.63 Therefore,
55. See id. at 308.
56. Id. at 309. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
57. Id. at 308. (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
58. Id. (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957)).
59. Id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887) (alteration in
original)).
60. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); see also Philip
McGarrigle & Vern Norviel, Laws of Nature and the Business of Biotechnology, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275 (2008).
61. FunkBros., 333 U.S. at 131.
62. See id.
63. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
62 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. l.J. [Vol. 25
the Court concluded that the non-naturally occurring genetically
engineered bacterium did not constitute an unpatentable product of
nature because its creation was the patentee's handiwork rather than
nature's.
64
Furthermore, the Court also rejected the argument that Congress
needed to expressly authorize protection for this new subject matter
because it was not contemplated when the patent laws were enacted,
reasoning that it was encompassed by the broad scope of the statutes
that Congress already had authorized precisely because inventions are
often unforeseeable. 65 A rule that unanticipated inventions cannot be
patented would conflict with the core concept of patent law that
anticipation undermines patentability.
66
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had
impliedly excluded living organisms from patentability by enacting
the 1930 Plant Patent Act 6 7 and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection
Act,68 which provided for intellectual property protection for plants
but not other living things, because these acts would have been
unnecessary if living things, such as plants, were patentable by
evaluating the legislative history of these acts. 69 Nothing in the
language of the legislative histories of either act suggested that
Congress enacted them because it believed § 101 did not include
living things. 70 The Court noted that Congress believed that the work
of the plant breeder in aid of nature constituted a patentable invention
and that these acts were passed to ensure intellectual property
protection for plants in the face of two factors that were impairing the
patenting of plants: (1) the belief evinced by the PTO that plants, even
artificially bred ones, were products of nature and (2) "the fact that
plants were thought not amenable to the 'written description'
requirement of the patent law." 71 Furthermore, the legislative history
indicated Congressional acknowledgment that a plant discovery
resulting from artificial breeding, not repeated in nature or reproduced
by nature and unaided by man, is different than the discovery of a
product of nature, such as a mineral, which is created wholly without
64. Id.
65. Id. at 314-15.
66. Id. at 316.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
68. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000).
69. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 311-12 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976)).
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the assistance of man.72 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
statutes specifically protecting plants draw a distinction between
products of nature, whether living or not, and manmade inventions,
rather than between living and inanimate things.73 Since genetically
engineered bacteria are the result of human ingenuity and research,
the mere existence of statutes specifically protecting plants does not
support the conclusion that genetically engineered bacteria are not
patentable.74
Finally, the Court rejected arguments against patentability of
genetically engineered microorganisms based on assertions "that
genetic research... may spread pollution and disease, that it may
result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to
depreciate the value of human life.",75 The Court reasoned Congress
was better suited to make such policy determinations.76
The Court's decision in Chakrabarty was a seminal event in the
evolution of patent law. The Court repudiated the rationales
previously employed to reject patents claiming living things.
Furthermore, the Court's broad language permitting patents for any
living thing created by man seemed to permit patents for all living
things, including larger organisms such as plants, animals, and even
humans.
C. Extension of Chakrabarty to Multicellular Organisms
1. Plants
In 1985, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board)
applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chakrabarty in holding that
an artificially bred corn plant that contained abnormally high levels of
the amino acid tryptophan was patentable subject matter under §
101.77 The Board reasoned that in light of Chakrabarty, the scope of §
101 encompassed manmade life forms, including plant life.78
Furthermore, the Board noted that the Chakrabarty Court's analysis
of the acts giving specific intellectual property protection to plants
clarified that the legislative intent was to extend intellectual property
protection to plant breeders who were hindered in procuring patents





77. Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 443-44 (B.P.A.I. 1985).
78. Id. at 444.
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and that it did not evince an intent to limit the scope of patentable
subject matter under § 101. 79 Thus, the availability of plant-specific
protection did not foreclose the availability of patent protection for
manmade plants.8 0
In 2001, the Supreme Court adopted the Board's position and
explicitly held that artificially developed plant breeds were patentable
subject matter under § 101 in J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, Inc.81 The Court reaffirmed its conclusions in
Chakrabarty that the patent laws were to be given wide scope
considering the broad language Congress employed in § 101 and that
the relevant distinction in determining the patentability of a living
thing is not between living and inanimate things, but between
products of nature, living or not, and manmade inventions.82 Thus, the
Court concluded that artificially bred plants were patentable subject
matter because they fall within the broad terms of § 101 that include
manufactures and compositions of matter.83 Furthermore, the Court
adopted the Board's conclusion that the statutes providing for plant-
specific intellectual property protection do not limit the scope of
patentable subject matter under § 101 because Congress did not give
any indication that it intended to do so, and accordingly, such statutes
do not foreclose the patentability of artificially bred plants.8 4 Given
these decisions, the PTO now routinely grants patents for manmade
plants.85
2. Animals
In contrast to plants, neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal
Circuit have squarely faced the issue of whether non-naturally
occurring animals developed by man are patentable, although they
appear to be encompassed by the Chakrabarty Court's broad
language in a published decision. Even in the wake of Chakrabarty,
the PTO refused to grant patents for multicellular animals on the
79. Id. at 445.
80. See id. at 446.
81. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145-46 (2001).
82. Id. at 130.
83. See id. at 131-32.
84. See id. at 145-46.
85. Edmund J. Sease, From Microbes, to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: Patentability
of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 551, 563 (1989).
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ground that it required explicit judicial or congressional authorization
to do so.
86
In 1987, the Board faced this issue when it decided Ex parte
Allen.87 In Allen, the patentee sought to patent polyploid oysters on
the basis that their polyploidy was induced by the application of
pressure on oyster zygotes by the patentee.88 The Board noted that
under Chakrabarty's holding that § 101 included manmade life forms,
"the issue ... in determining whether the claimed subject matter is
patentable ... is simply whether that subject matter was made by
man." 89 Thus, the Board concluded that a non-naturally occurring
animal made by man was patentable subject matter.90 As the claimed
oysters did not occur naturally without the intervention of man, the
Board held that they were non-naturally occurring manufactures or
compositions of matter and thus were patentable subject matter.91
Only four days after the Board delivered its decision in Allen, the
PTO issued a notice stating that the PTO considered non-naturally
occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms patentable subject
matter as compositions of matter or manufactures. 92 The PTO also
indicated that a manufacture or composition of matter occurring in
nature, such as an animal, would not be patentable unless "given a
new form, quality, properties or combination not present in the
original article existing in nature in accordance with existing law."
93
This statement was also the first by either a court or the PTO
concerning the patentability of human beings. The PTO stated that "a
human being will not be considered ... patentable subject matter
under [§] 101 [because t]he grant of a limited, but exclusive property




Accordingly, the PTO required that any claim "directed to a non-plant
multicellular organism which would include a human being within its
86. Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice on the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
160 (1988); Paul Blunt, Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living Organisms, 48
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1365, 1369 (1998).
87. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987), affid, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (unpublished table decision).
88. Id. at 1426.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1427.
91. Id.




66 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
scope include the limitation 'non-human' to avoid this ground of
rejection."95 However, the PTO did not specify a precise provision of
the Constitution that it relied on in reaching the conclusion that
humans were not patentable. Commentators speculate that the PTO
was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery.
96
After the announcement, various animal rights groups, animal
husbanders, and farmers challenged the PTO's notice by filing a
lawsuit claiming it was not properly promulgated under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 9 7 The Federal Circuit held that the suit
should be dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing.
98
However, it suggested in dicta that it considered non-naturally
occurring animals patentable subject matter as it noted that the
Chakrabarty Court held that all manmade life forms were patentable
and pointed out that it affirmed the Board's decision in Allen, which
expressly included animals in the realm of patentable subject matter,
albeit in a summary unpublished opinion.99
In April 1988, the PTO issued the first patent for a multicelluar
animal.100 The patent was issued for a transgenic mouse known as the
Harvard oncomouse, a mouse in which at least one additional gene
has been introduced into the germ cells of the animal.10 1 Harvard
researchers introduced a human oncogene into the mouse that made it
particularly disposed to breast cancer.10 2 Since 1988, the PTO has
granted numerous patents for animals not occurring in nature,
including other transgenic animals containing additional human and
nonhuman genes and a rabbit infected with the HIV virus.' 
03
D. Rejection of an Application for a Patent for a Human-
Animal Chimera by the PTO
On December 18, 1997, Stuart Newman, a biology professor at
New York Medical College, and Jeremy Rifkin, a biotechnology
95. Id.
96. Magnani, supra note 1, at 448. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Beyond Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy Over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM.
U. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1992).
97. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
98. Id. at 925.
99. Id. at 927-28 (citing In re Allen, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (unpublished table
decision)).
100. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
101. See, e.g., Warren D. Woessner, The Evolution of Patents on Life-Transgenic
Animals, Clones and Stem Cells, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 830-31 (2001).
102. Id. at 832.
103. See, e.g., Woessner, supra note 101, at 833-34.
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activist, filed a patent application for human-animal chimeras that
could be up to 50% human and for several processes to make them.'
0 4
Newman and Rifkin did not actually create a human-animal chimera
nor did they express any intention to do so. 10 5 They filed their
application for the purposes of preventing other scientists from
creating human-animal chimeras and engaging in human-animal
chimera research for the twenty-year patent term.' 06 The application
sparked a debate about the morality of patenting such life forms,
pressured policymakers to develop a set of formal rules regarding the
patentability of these life forms, and convinced the American public
to support an outright ban on the synthesis of human-animal
chimeras.
10 7
Newman and Rifkin publicized their application in April 1998.108
The PTO immediately responded by putting out a press release stating
that human-animal chimeras might not be patentable because they
would fail to meet the public policy and morality components of §
101 's requirement that an invention must be useful to be patentable.10 9
Early judicial decisions held that this requirement encompasses moral
or beneficial utility, rendering inventions injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society unpatentable. 110 As authority
for its position, the PTO cited one of these decisions, Lowell v.
Lewis,' a case decided by Justice Story in 1817. Furthermore, in the
wake of the Newman-Rifkin application, PTO Commissioner Bruce
Lehman indicated that human-animal chimeras were unpatentable
104. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 129; David Dickson, Legal Fight
Looms over Patent Bid on Human/Animal Chimaeras, 392 NATURE 423 (1998); Rick Weiss,
Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A 12.
105. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 129; Weiss, supra note 104. An invention need
not be built to be patentable. E.g., Weiss, supra note 104. An invention is patentable as
constructively reduced to practice if the inventor's application discloses information that would
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue expectation. See
In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
106. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39 at 129; Dickson, supra note 104.
107. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 129; Magnani, supra note 1, at 443;
Weiss, supra note 104.
108. E.g. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 129.
109. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 225 (citing Press Release, U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Media Advisory (Apr. 1, 1998), available at
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98.06.htm.). Section 101 permits patents only for
inventions that are "new and useful." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
110. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); see also
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
111. Lowell v. Lewis 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
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when he stated in an interview that "there will be no patents on
monsters."' 12
However, when the PTO officially rejected the Newman-Rifkin
application in June 1999, it did not do so on moral utility grounds.
1 13
Rather, the PTO concluded that the human-animal chimeras claimed
in the application were not patentable subject matter under § 101.114
The PTO reasoned that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claimed invention, the human-animal chimeras, encompassed a
human being.1 15 The PTO went on to summarily conclude that an
invention that was not limited to nonhuman creatures and included a
human being in it scope was not patentable subject matter because
Congress did not intend for § 101 to include the patenting of
humans. 1 6 However, the PTO cited no authorities for this proposition.
The PTO's logic gave rise to several questions. First, the PTO did not
explain its holding that the claimed chimeras, which could be at most
50% human, embraced a human being. This suggests that the PTO
believes that a creature need not be completely human to constitute a
human being and that degrees of humanity less than 100% and even
less than 50% are sufficient to render a creature human. Thus, one
commentator surmised that although the PTO did not mention moral
utility in its rejection of the application, the rejection was "in part, a
rejection of a patent based on (moral) utility grounds."'1 17 Second, the
PTO did not distinguish transgenic animals containing human genetic
material, such as the Harvard oncomouse, that it had previously held
patentable and did not explain why such transgenic animals do not
embrace a human being.
The PTO issued its final rejection of the Newman-Rifkin patent
application in its final office action in the matter in August 2004.118 In
the final rejection, the PTO reaffirmed its conclusory finding that
human beings are not patentable subject matter.1 19 However, the PTO
provided additional explanation for its conclusion that the chimeras
112. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 225 (quoting 'Morality' Aspect of Utility
Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 555 (Apr. 9, 1998)).
113. Seeid.at130-31.
114. Id. at 131 (quoting Patent Application Is Disallowed as 'Embracing' Human Being,
58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 203 (June 17, 1999)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Stankovi6, supra note 19,1 23.
118. U.S. Patent Application No. 08/993,564 (filed Dec. 19, 1997), Office Action from
Deborah Crouch, Primary Examiner (Feb. 9, 2004).
119. Id.at2l.
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claimed in the application could encompass humans. The PTO noted
that chimeric embryos could produce animals with only one chimeric
organ or that exhibit no chimerism at all (either entirely human or
animal). 20 Thus, the patent examiner concluded that the claims
presented in the Newman-Rifkin patent were written in such a way as
to encompass a creature that was completely human since chimeric
embryos covered by the patents could produce "an animal of one cell
type or predominately one cell type.' 121 The language "predominately
one cell type" suggests that, despite its clarification, the PTO
considers animals human even though they are less than completely
human genetically or in terms of cell composition. However, the PTO
does not provide any standards for determining whether a creature is
an animal or human based on the percentages of animal and human
cells it contains.
Newman and Rifkin did not respond to the PTO's final rejection
of their patent application for human-animal chimeras. In 2005, the
PTO found the application abandoned.
12 2
E. Congressional Regulation of Human-Animal Chimera
Research and Patentability
Recently, Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas introduced a bill
dubbed the Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005.123 The bill
would have prohibited any person from creating or attempting to
create a human chimera. 124 For the purposes of the Act, a human
chimera was broadly defined to include various methods of
introducing non-human cells into human embryos.125 However, the
bill never made it out of committee. Also, despite the fact that the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has asserted
jurisdiction over human cloning, it has not attempted to extend its




122. See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/993,564, Notice of Abandonment from Deborah
Crouch, Primary Examiner (Feb. 25, 2005).
123. Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 1373, 109th Cong. (2005).
124. Id. at § 302. Even if Congress were to prohibit the development of human-animal
chimeras, such a law does not necessarily proscribe patentability without an express provision
doing so. Indeed, courts have found radar detectors patentable even though their use, including
that by the inventor, is illegal in some states. See Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
125. S. 1373, 109th Cong. § 301(1) (2005).
126. Nicole E. Kopinski, Human-Nonhuman Chimeras: A Regulatory Proposal on the
Blurring of Species Lines, 45 B.C. L. REV. 619, 620 (2004).
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No legislation or proposed legislation has hitherto directly
addressed the patentability of chimeras. However, several bills have
been introduced in Congress to ban the patenting of human tissues
and human beings, but none of them have become law. 127 Most
notable of these is the proposed Transgenic Animal Patent Reform
Act of 1988, otherwise known as the 1988 Animal Patent Act, that
included an amendment to § 101 that expressly excluded "human
beings" from the scope of patentable subject matter.12' The
Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1988 passed in the
House. 129 However, the Senate never approved the bill, and it failed to
become law.'
30
Even though Congress has failed to expressly exclude human
beings from the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101, it has
restricted the patentability of human organisms using its
appropriations power. In an amendment to the federal budget for 2004
introduced by Rep. David Weldon of Florida, known as the Weldon
Amendment, Congress stated that federal funds provided for the
operation of the PTO "may [not] be used to issue patents on claims
directed to or encompassing a human organism." 131 Thus, even if
human organisms are patentable subject matter under § 101,132 the
PTO is prohibited from issuing patents for them. This provision
serves to codify the PTO's position, expressed in its 1987 statement
and its denial of the Newman-Rifkin patent, that human organisms are
not patentable.' 33 Indeed, Rep. Weldon, the sponsor of the amendment
that bears his name, stated that the amendment was intended to codify
the PTO's previous position against the patentability of human
127. See, e.g., S. 387, 103d Cong. (1993) (proposing a moratorium on patenting animal
and human tissues); Transgenic Animal Patent Act, H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988) (proposing
an amendment to § 101 excluding human beings from the scope of patentable subject matter).
128. Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988). Under the
Animal Patent Act, § 101 would have read: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title,
except that human beings are not patentable subject matter," Id.
129. House Passage ofAnimal Patent Bill, 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
499, 502 (1988).
130. Daniel J. Kevles, Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Beyond: The Political Economy of
Patenting Life, in PRIVATE SCIENCE 65, 76 (Arnold Thackray ed., 1998).
131. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3,
101 (2004).
132. See infra Part ll.B. 1
133. Kopinski, supra note 126, at 635.
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organisms. 134 Likewise, the PTO interprets the Weldon Amendment
in this manner.' 
35
The Weldon Amendment does not expressly address chimeras or
bar their patentability in all cases. However, the legislative history
suggests that the Amendment tracks the PTO's policy concerning
chimeras articulated in its rejection of the Newman-Rifkin patent and
proscribes the patentability of at least some chimeras. 136 While
debating the amendment, Rep. Weldon noted without disapproval that
the PTO has granted patents for transgenic organisms, such as the
Harvard oncomouse, that are modified to include a few human genes
allowing the production of a human protein or antibody, suggesting
that such organisms are patentable under the Weldon Amendment.131
However, Rep. Weldon also stated that the PTO has "rejected patents
on... half-human embryo[s] because [they] can broadly but
reasonably be construed as human organism[s]. 138 Thus, the
legislative history of the Weldon Amendment suggests that the
amendment's prohibitions are not confined to organisms that are
entirely human and foreclose the patentability of chimeras that
contain at least 50% human cells as they may be considered human
organisms. However, neither the Weldon Amendment nor its
legislative history articulate a precise definition of a human
organism-that is, the minimum amount of human cells, genes, or
characteristics an organism must have to be considered human for the
purposes of the statute. Rather, Rep. Weldon stated during floor
debate that the amendment "leaves the USPTO free to address new or
borderline issues on the same case-by-case basis as it already
does.,, 139 The PTO has not determined the percentage of human cells
or genetic material or the degree of human characteristics required to
134. E.g., Kopinksi, supra note 126, at 635 n.133 (citing Rick Weiss, Hill Negotiators
Agree to Bar Patents for Human Organisms, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at A19).
135. See Letter from James E. Rogan, Under Sec'y and Dir., U. S. Patent and Trademark
Office, to Hon. Ted Stevens, Chairman, Comm'n on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, at 2 (Nov. 20,
2003), available at
http://www.nrlc.org/KillingEmbryos/Human Patenting/WeldonamendUSPTO.pdf (indicating
that the Weldon Amendment "does not alter the [PTO] policy on the non-patentability of human
life-forms at any stage of development and is fully consistent with [PTO] policy"); accord
Kopinski, supra note 126, at 635 n.133; Weiss, supra note 134.
136. 149 CONG. REC. E2234 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
137. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 636 n.136 (quoting 149 CONG. REc. E2234 (daily
ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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justify patent prohibition. 140 Thus, the Weldon Amendment does little
to resolve the question of how many human characteristics, genes, or
cells are necessary to render an organism within its prohibitions.
However, because the Weldon Amendment was part of an
appropriations bill for 2004, it was limited in its impact as it only
affected patents that were to issue in 2004.141 A similar bill would
have to be passed and signed into law by the President each year for
its prohibitions to remain in effect. 142 After its initial passage,
Congress reenacted the Weldon Amendment in the federal budgets
for 2005 and 2006.143 The 2006 enactment of the Weldon Amendment
expired on September 30, 2006.144 Congress did not expressly reenact
the Weldon Amendment in the 2007 federal budget.1 45 However,
although the barrier to patentability of human organisms erected by
the Weldon Amendment was not expressly attached to the funds
expressly appropriated for the PTO in 2007, the continuing act
appropriating these funds provided that "[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided in [the act], the requirements, authorities,
conditions, limitations, and other provisions of the [appropriations
acts in force for 2006] shall continue in effect., 146 Nothing in the
140. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 636-37 n.140.
141. Judith L. Toffenetti & Thomas A. Haag, Biotech and Ethics Collide in Patent-
Funding Debate, WASH. Bus. J., Aug 20-26, 2004.
142. Id.
143. Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 623, 119 Stat. 2290, 2342 (2005); Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 626, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920 (2004).
144. See Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 626, 119 Stat. 2290, 2290 (2005).
145. A bill providing for the reenactment of the Weldon Amendment as part of the 2007
federal budget passed in the House but was not passed in the Senate. H.R. 5672, 109th Cong. §
618 (2006).
146. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-5, §§ 104,
20934, 121 Stat. 8, 9, 45 (2007) (appropriating funds for the operation of the patent office). The
amended Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007, which expressly provided for funding
for the PTO, was enacted on Feb. 15, 2007. The Weldon Amendment was in force for the period
between the expiration of the 2006 enactment on Sept. 30, 2006 and the passage of the amended
Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2007 on the basis of the passage of continuing
appropriations acts providing for PTO funding until the passage of an appropriations act
providing for, or otherwise applicable to, PTO funding for the 2007 budget that could not be
used for activities that appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available for under the
2006 federal budget. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, 109 Pub. L. No. 289, div.
B, §§ 101, 104, 106, 120 Stat. 1257 (2006); Pub. L. No. 109-369, 120 Stat. 2678 (2006); Pub. L.
No. 383, 120 Stat. 2678 (2006). Since the Weldon Amendment was enacted as part of the 2006
budget and expressly rendered funds appropriated for the PTO unavailable for patenting of
human organisms, the restriction on patentability of human organisms imposed by the Weldon
Amendment remained in force during this period.
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2007 continuing appropriations act appropriating funds for the PTO
expressly repudiates the Weldon Amendment's restriction on the
patentability of human organisms. Thus, despite the fact that
Cognress did not formally reenact it, the Weldon Amendment's
restrictions applied to the funds appropriated for the operation of the
PTO in 2007. However, Congress explicitly reenacted the Weldon
Amendment as part of the 2008 federal budget. 47 This latest ban on
the patentability of human organisms formally expired on September,
30 2008,148 and Congress has failed to formally reenact the Weldon
Amendment as part of the 2009 federal budget. 49 However, Congress
enacted a continuing appropriations act providing for funding for the
PTO until March 6, 2009, or the passage of an appropriations act
providing for, or otherwise applicable to, PTO funding for the 2009
budget that cannot be used for activities that appropriations, funds, or
other authority were not available for under the 2008 federal
budget. 50 Thus, since Congress expressly made funds allocated to the
PTO unavailable for the patenting of human organisms in the 2008
federal budget, the restriction on patentability of human organisms
imposed by the Weldon Amendment remains in force as long as the
continuing appropriations act is in effect.
The Weldon Amendment was in force when the PTO issued its
final rejection of the Newman-Rifkin patent application for human-
animal chimeras on the ground that the claims embraced human
organisms. However, the PTO based its rejection on its previous
conclusion that § 101 did not embrace human organisms rather than
on the Weldon Amendment.'15 The PTO's rationale would, at least at
first blush, provide an unambiguous statutory basis for its decision.152
Although it is unclear why the PTO did not rely on the Weldon
147. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 520, 121 Stat.
1844, 1928 (2007).
148. Id. §§ 6, 520.
149. A bill providing for the reenactment of the Weldon Amendment as part of the 2009
federal budget has been introduced in the Senate, but has not been voted on as of the time of
printing. S. 3182, 110th Cong. § 518 (2008).
150. See Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, §§ 101, 104, 106, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008). See also id § 101
(providing that funds available for 2009 under the continuing appropriations act were available
under the "authority and conditions of" the 2008 appropriations acts). The continuing
appropriations act also provides that funds available under it were available under the "authority
and conditions of' the 2008 appropriations acts. See id. § 101. The Weldon Amendment
prescribing that none of the funds appropriated or made available by Congress be used for the
patenting of human organisms can be viewed as a condition attached to the funds.
151. See PTO Final Rejection, supra note 118.
152. Id.
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Amendment in the final rejection, it is possible that the PTO did not
want to rely on statutory language that expires on an annual basis and
thus might not always be present, especially when the patent
application process usually takes longer than one year.
II. PATENTING HUMAN-ANIMAL CHIMERAS
Neither the courts nor the Board have broached the issue of the
patentability of human-animal chimeras. The PTO office actions
rejecting the Newman-Rifkin patent do not create a legal precedent. 53
The abandonment of the Newman-Rifkin patent ensures that it will
not be litigated.
This Part explores the legal issues concerning the patentability of
human-animal chimeras. Congress, the courts, and the PTO have all
failed to provide a standard for determining whether a given chimera
has enough human cells, genes, or characteristics to qualify as human.
This question is of immense importance as it appears to determine the
class of human-animal chimeras that are patentable, at least as long as
Congress continues to reenact the Weldon Amendment in its
appropriations bills. Indeed, courts and the PTO are unable to
effectively and consistently apply the Weldon Amendment in the
chimera context until the courts adopt a workable definition of
"human being."'
154
Thus, this Part begins by evaluating various standards proposed
for a chimera to qualify as a human being and concludes that the best
standard is one that defines humanity based on the higher faculties
and physical characteristics associated with human beings. The
definition of humanity bears on the constitutional issues related to the
patentability of human-animal chimeras, such as whether the
Thirteenth Amendment, which applies to humans and not animals,
forecloses the patentability of chimeras. Then, this Part explores the
statutory and constitutional issues related to the patentability of
human-animal chimeras. The first such issue is whether human-
animal chimeras constitute patentable subject matter under § 101.
This Part concludes that human-animal chimeras, even those which
qualify as humans (as well as fully-human manmade inventions) are
patentable subject matter. Second, this Part examines the implications
of this conclusion for the effectiveness of the Weldon Amendment as
a vehicle to foreclose patentability of human organisms, which
Congress believed was in concordance with § 101 when it was
153. Stankovi6, supra note 19, 25.
154. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 450.
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passed. Third, this Part examines the constitutionality of patents on
human-animal chimeras, including those which may reasonably be
classified as humans, under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments and concludes that these constitutional provisions do
not foreclose the patentability of these chimeras. Fourth, this Part
examines the argument set forth by the PTO that human-animal
chimeras are not patentable because they lack the requisite moral
utility and concludes that a court is unlikely to accept this argument.
Finally, this Part concludes that the patent law doctrines of novelty
and nonobviousness do not foreclose patentability of human-animal
chimeras.
A. Standards for Humanity
As Congress has failed to articulate standards for the amount of
human cells, genes, or characteristics a creature must possess to be
considered human, this task is left to the courts. However, the courts
have never discussed the requirements for an organism to be
considered human in any context. The PTO and commentators are
generally in agreement about several easy cases. Transgenic animals
containing one or a handful of human genes are not rendered human
by virtue of the fact that they contain these genes.' 55 Indeed, the PTO
has granted patents on transgenic animals containing human genes,
such as the Harvard oncomouse, and the legislative history of the
Weldon Amendment, foreclosing patentability of human organisms,
indicates that the amendment does not affect the patentability of
transgenic animals in any way.1 56 These transgenic animals share two
characteristics. First, they contain a relatively small percentage of
human genes. Second, unlike chimeras, transgenic animals contain no
fully human cells. Rather, each cell in the animal contains a small
number of human genes. At the other end of the spectrum, no one
would seriously question a conclusion that a transplant patient who
received an animal organ was still human after the transplant.
157
Outside of these extreme situations, there is little consensus as to the
humanity of chimeras.
Commentators have proposed both quantitative and qualitative
models for determining humanity.1 58 In quantitative models, the issue
155. See, e.g., Kopinski, supra note 126, at 636 n.136 (quoting 149 CONG. REC. E2234
(daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon)); Magnani, supra note 1, at 449.
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 1, at 449.
158. See, e.g., Stankovi6, supra note 19, 34.
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of what type of biological material to use as a criterion for
determination of the human character of an organism is a complex
one.' 59 Possibilities include quantities of genetic material (DNA),
proteins, and metabolites and the number of genes, cells, tissues, and
organs. 160 Some commentators have suggested that a creature is
human if 50% or more of its genetic material is of human origin.161
From a common sense point of view, this approach seems appealing
and reasonable. 62 However, it is somewhat simplistic and artificial.163
A determination that an animal possessing 49% human genetic
material is not human although the animal displays substantial human
characteristics for the purposes of patentability seems arbitrary.
Furthermore, this rule produces some absurd results. Chimpanzees
share 95% or greater genetic homology with humans, yet no one
would ever consider a chimpanzee human.' 64 Although one might
base this approach on the percentage of the creature's genetic material
actually derived from human sources, it appears illegitimate for the
source of genetic material to affect the analysis of whether it renders
an organism human.
Further complications in using the percentage of genetic material
criterion arise in the context of human-animal chimeras that are not
present in the transgenic animal context. Unlike transgenic animals,
which contain a given percentage of human genetic material in all of
their cells, chimeras contain a given percentage of cells that contain
only human genes with the rest of the cells containing entirely
nonhuman genetic material. 65 Thus, chimeras contain portions that
159. See id
160. See id
161. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 449.
162. See id. at 449-50.
163. Id. at 450.
164. Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 18 n.93 (citing Roy J. Britten, Divergence Between
Samples of Chimpanzee and Human DNA Sequences Is 5%, Counting Indels, 99 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. So. U.S. 13633, 13633 (2002)).
165. A human-animal chimera does not necessarily contain the same percentage of human
cells and human genetic material because human and animal cells do not necessarily contain the
same amount of genetic material. See, e.g., ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 10, at 20. For instance,
the human genome is larger than the mouse genome. Thus, a human-mouse chimera with a
given percentage of human cells contains a greater percentage of human genetic material (DNA)
because each human cell in the chimera contains a greater amount of human DNA than the
amount of mouse DNA present in each mouse cell. Thus, a tenable argument can be made that
percentage of cells rather than percentage of genetic material should be examined in gauging the
humanity of a chimera. The percentage of cells, rather than the sheer amount of genetic material
derived from a given species, which depends in part on the size of the species' genomes (in
addition to the number of cells), determines the character of the chimera. See, e.g., Press
Release, National Human Genome Research Institute, International Team of Researchers
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are fully human while transgenic animals do not. Therefore, they
might be considered more human than a transgenic animal with the
identical percentage of human genetic material. Indeed, many people
would consider human certain chimeras consisting of much less than
50% human genetic material.1 66 As chimeras possess some cells that
are completely human, it could be possible to create a chimera that
has the body and outward appearance of an animal, but the brain and
central nervous system of a human. 167 Such a creature would contain
far less than 50% human genetic material or human cells, but many
people would consider such a creature to be human, depending on its
cognitive abilities. 68 Thus, the use of quantitative standards for
humanity is problematic, especially in the human-animal chimera
context.
These problems and inconsistencies associated with a
quantitative standard are ameliorated under a qualitative standard
focusing on the higher faculties associated with humanity. One
commentator has suggested that humanity be determined by a case-
by-case evaluation of whether a creature "possesses significant human
characteristics" in terms of possessing higher faculties such as:
[T]he ability to reason (including, but not limited to, the ability to
use facts and argue them, to arrive at conclusions from premises in
a logical manner, to explain observed phenomena and to form
beliefs based on facts); the ability to evaluate principles and
observations to arrive at reasoned decisions; the ability to
formulate speech and communicate; the ability to write; the ability
to develop meaningful personal relationships with other human
beings on the basis of equality; the demonstration of awareness of
self as a unique and separate being; the ability to feel concern for
others; or any other higher faculty.
Assembles Draft Sequence of Mouse Genome (May 6, 2002),
http://www.genome.gov/10002983 ("The mouse genome is contained in 20 chromosome pairs
and the current results suggest that it is about 2.7 billion base pairs in size, or about 15 percent
smaller than the human genome. The human genome is 3.1 billion base pairs spread out over 23
pairs of chromosomes.").
166. Magnani, supra note 1, at 450.
167. See id. Indeed, efforts are underway to create a mouse with a brain comprised of
entirely human tissue. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
168. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 450. Thus, one of the flaws with quantitative
approaches is that the number of cells required for people to consider a chimera human might
fluctuate depending on which organs and/or organ systems are of human origin.
169. Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve
Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 480-81 (1989).
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A related standard that has been proposed considers human-
animal chimeras human if the chimera itself would consider itself
human, demonstrating the ability to reason in a manner known as self-
awareness.170 By focusing on a creature's qualitative characteristics,
these approaches track people's ideas of what creatures are human
and what characteristics make a creature human better than the
quantitative approaches. For instance, a creature with a human brain
and central nervous system that outwardly resembles an animal would
qualify as human under this standard while it would not under a
quantitative standard. More specific to the patent context, a creature
with these higher faculties characteristic of humans is capable of
suffering psychic harm by being property or being enslaved. The
Supreme Court considers the Thirteenth Amendment to strive to
prevent the psychic harm caused by slavery as it stated that the
amendment was directed at the institution of slavery as well as its
"badges and incidents., 171 Thus, if a chimera possessed the mental
faculties to suffer such psychic harm, courts would likely consider it
human for the purposes of entitlement to the protections afforded by
the Thirteenth Amendment.' 
72
However, these approaches also have serious flaws inasmuch as
they fail to precisely track people's conceptions of the definition of
humanity. Under such conceptions, reasoning ability and other types
of higher mental faculties alone do not determine humanity. No one
could reasonably contend that a seriously mentally handicapped
individual who does not possess the higher faculties discussed above
and is unable to understand that she is human is less than human.
Thus, considering such an individual property would be unethical and
in violation of the rights accorded a human being by the law.
Likewise, many people might consider a chimera with many of the
physical characteristics of a human being, but without the mental
capacities associated with a normal human a human being and entitled
to the legal rights accorded to humans.
Perhaps in order to abate these concerns with qualitative
approaches to assessing humanity based on reasoning ability, at least
one commentator has proposed a standard where an organism is
considered human if it either possesses the high mental faculties
170. See Magnani, supra note I, at 450.
171. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
172. If the kind of property rights in a human organism conferred by a patent were
foreclosed by the Thirteenth Amendment, such chimeras would not be patentable. See infra Part
II.C.
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associated with humanity or was begotten of human gametes (i.e.,
human egg and sperm), regardless of whether the genetic material of
the gametes or the resulting embryo was genetically altered.1 73 While
a severely mentally handicapped individual would be considered
human under this rubric, in keeping with people's general conceptions
of humanity, this framework proves unsatisfactory in the human-
animal chimera context. Consider a chimera with a human body and
appearance but an animal brain and central nervous system. Such a
creature would neither have the higher mental faculties nor be born
from human parents or gametes. However, people would likely be
chary to treat such a chimera, which is identical to a human with
respect to outward appearance, as less than human. From a moral and
intuitional standpoint, it is highly unlikely that society would brook
the creation of a genetically engineered underclass consisting of
chimeras that outwardly appear human but are not considered human
and, accordingly, are not afforded the legal protections and rights
granted to humans with severe defects in reasoning ability. Indeed, it
seems unseemly to distinguish human organisms of like physical
appearance and reasoning ability based on how they were engendered,
whether by natural birth or the tinkering of man with human
organisms.
A preferred standard would accurately reflect people's
conception of humanity. Such a standard takes both higher mental
faculties and physical characteristics of human beings into account in
terms of a sliding scale. As the above discussion suggests, both of
these aspects shape people's conception of humanity. Generally
speaking, people perceive reasoning ability to be the touchstone for
humanity yet do not consider humans that have severe mental
disabilities and that are wholly incapable of reasoning divested of
their humanity. Thus, a chimera that possesses human higher faculties
but that physically resembles an animal will be considered human.
The more a given chimera physically resembles a human, the fewer
mental faculties are required for it to be considered to "possess
significant human characteristics"' 7 4 and thus constitute a human
organism. Likewise, the more mental faculties a chimera possesses,
the less physical resemblance to a human is required for it to be
considered human. Under this scheme, chimeras that have significant
human characteristics, and thus would be considered human by
community standards, will be recognized as human, and those that are
173. Fishman, supra note 169, at 480-8 1.
174. Id. at481.
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more like animals, even those animals that are close genetic relatives
to humans such as chimpanzees, will not be.
B. Human-Animal Chimeras and Human Organisms Are
Patentable Subject Matter Under the Supreme Court's
Broad Interpretation of§ 101
Although the Weldon Amendment appears to effectively render
human-animal chimeras considered human unpatentable at first blush,
it does not cover chimeras that are not considered human.
Furthermore, a discussion of whether human-animal chimeras
considered human and human organisms themselves constitute
patentable subject matter under § 101 is still germane after the
Weldon Amendment for several reasons. First, the Weldon
Amendment and its successors are parts of appropriation bills that
expire annually. Thus, the Weldon Amendment must be reenacted
every year, and there is no guarantee that Congress will renew it
annually, especially since Congress has failed to formally reenact it
on more than one occasion. Second, as demonstrated by the analysis
below, the PTO's conclusion that § 101 does not encompass human
inventions is inconsistent with the language of § 101 and its
interpretation by the Supreme Court. Thus, in regard to the
patentability of human organisms, the Weldon Amendment, an
appropriations statute, appears to conflict with the substantive
authorization in § 101. This conflict serves as the basis for a weighty
argument against the ability of the Weldon Amendment to foreclose
the patentability of human organisms.
1. Human-Animal Chimeras and Human Inventions Are
Patentable Subject Matter Under § 101
In holding that living microorganisms that were made by man
and did not occur in nature were patentable subject matter in
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court employed broad language indicating
that any living thing made by man that was not naturally occurring,
which would include human-animal chimeras and human beings
themselves, constitutes patentable subject matter. The Court defined
the realm of patentable subject matter as "anything under the sun that
is made by man."17 5 In extending Chakrabarty to multicellular
animals in Allen, the Board stated that the issue in determining
175. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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whether a living thing was patentable "is simply whether that subject
matter was made by man."
'1 76
Human-animal chimeras do not occur in nature. Thus, as they do
not exist in nature without the intervention of man, human-animal
chimeras are patentable subject matter under Chakrabarty and Allen.
This is the case regardless of whether the chimera is considered
human by any applicable legal standard. It also applies to transgenic
humans, fully human creatures genetically engineered to contain a
gene-one encoding a bacterial enzyme, for instance-that does not
naturally occur in humans. Therefore, straightforward application of
the language defining patentable subject matter in Chakrabarty and
Allen indicates that human-animal chimeras, whether considered
human or not, or other manmade human inventions, are patentable
subject matter under § 101. Nothing in Chakrabarty or its progeny
suggests that chimeras that are considered humans or even human
beings themselves are not patentable subject matter. 177 Under the
reasoning set forth in these cases, transgenic humans and human-
animal chimeras cannot be distinguished from nonhuman transgenic
and chimeric animals that are patentable under Allen.
The PTO cited no precedent or authorities to support its
conclusion that humans and chimeras considered human were not
patentable subject matter under § 101.178 Furthermore, the PTO's
reasoning that human inventions are unpatentable because Congress
did not intend for § 101 to encompass their patentability was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty. The Chakrabarty Court
explicitly rejected the argument that Congress needed to expressly
authorize patentability of new areas of subject matter, such as living
things, because they were not contemplated when the patent laws
were enacted. 179 The Court reasoned that new subject matter areas
were patentable because Congress authorized a broad scope of
patentable subject matter to include all inventions made by man
precisely for the reason that new inventions are often unforeseeable
and that a rule that unanticipated inventions cannot be patentable
conflicts with the long-standing patent law concept that anticipation
undermines patentability. 80 In addition, the Court found that
legislative history and intent, as well as the statutory purpose
176. Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1426 (B.P.A.I. 1987).
177. See Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 14.
178. See id.
179. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314-15.
180. Seeid. at314-16.
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underlying § 101, are not relevant considerations in evaluating the
scope of patentable subject matter because Congress unambiguously
cast § 101 in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory
goal of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. 8'
Congress did not likely anticipate the creation of human-animal
chimeras or manmade human beings when it enacted § 101.182 Under
Chakrabarty, this fact does not foreclose their patentability because,
as discussed above, they fall under the broad scope of § 101, and any
invention within this scope is patentable subject matter. Even if the
PTO correctly determined that Congress did not intend for § 101 to
encompass human inventions, despite offering no evidence from the
legislative history or otherwise to support this conclusion, Congress's
actual intention with regard to their patentability is immaterial
because Congress unambiguously provided for a broad scope of
patentable subject matter that encompassed human inventions in §
101.183 Therefore, the PTO's assertions that inventions involving
humans are not patentable subject matter under § 101 run contrary to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute and constitute "a
unilateral reinterpretation of the law."
' 184
Several commentators have suggested that the fact that the PTO
has issued patents on living things derived from human beings, such
as transgenic animals containing human genes and human cell lines,
cuts in favor of the patentability of human-animal chimeras, including
those classified as human, as well as other human inventions."1 While
the issuance of these patents indicates that even the PTO believes that
the mere presence of human genes or individual cells derived from
humans in an invention does not render it unpatentable, an argument
for the patentability of human-animal chimeras, especially those that
are considered human, is less than convincing because chimeras (and
full human beings) are readily distinguishable from transgenic
animals and cells. Unlike chimeras, transgenic animals and cells do
not display a significant amount of human characteristics and cannot
fairly be considered to constitute a human being. Relatively speaking,
transgenic animals such as the Harvard oncomouse contain a very
181. Seeid. at315.
182. See Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 17.
183. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) ("When
confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, [courts] ordinarily do not
look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning. [In such cases,] it is not necessary to look
beyond the words of the statute.").
184. Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 14.
185. See, e.g., id. at 9-10; Magnani, supra note 1, at 448.
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small percentage of human genes. 86 These animals physically
resemble animals and do not have significant human characteristics.
In contrast, a chimera containing a sufficient percentage of human
cells might resemble a human. Furthermore, unlike human-animal
chimeras, which may contain a significant percentage of entirely
human cells, transgenic animals contain no human cells. Human cell
lines do not constitute an organism, but rather are free living cells
maintained under laboratory conditions.1 87 They are unable to be used
in generating a human being and share few, if any, characteristics
with human beings, save for the fact they are derived from human
tissue. In addition, human cell lines contain mutations in their DNA,
including additional chromosomes in some cases, so they do not truly
contain the same genetic material as humans. 88 However, extended
discussion of the extension of the PTO's determination that certain
genetically engineered inventions are patentable to the human-animal
chimera context is unwarranted given the analysis above based on §
101 and cases interpreting it, demonstrating that human-animal
chimeras are patentable subject matter.
2. Implications for the Effectiveness of the Weldon
Amendment in Foreclosing Patentability of Human
Organisms
The conclusion that the scope of patentable subject matter as
defined by § 101 encompasses human-animal chimeras considered
human as well as other human inventions serves as the foundation for
a persuasive argument that the Weldon Amendment does not
effectively foreclose patentability of such creatures. When Congress
enacted the Weldon Amendment, it assumed that the amendment
explicitly codified the PTO's practice of forbidding patents for human
organisms as outside the scope of patentable subject matter under §
101.189 Indeed, statements by Rep. Weldon, the sponsor of the
amendment, in the legislative history indicated that the Weldon
186. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark: How America's First
Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. &TECH 457, 457 n.3 (2005).
187. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 n.2 (Cal. 1990);
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 10, at 472.
188. See Cell line - definition from Biology-Online.org, Sep. 29, 2006,
http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Cell_line; Definition: cell line from Online Medical
Dictionary, Mar. 26, 1998, http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-bin/omd?cell+line. See, e.g., ALBERTS
ET AL., supra note 10, at 472-75, 1323-24; Merryn Macville et al., Comprehensive and
Definitive Molecular Cytogenetic Characterization of HeLa Cells by Spectral Karyotyping, 59
CANCER RES. 141 (1999).
189. See, e.g., Kopinski, supra note 126, at 635 & n.133, 636 & nn. 136-37.
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Amendment "was not meant to change existing policies."' 190 Thus, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to alter the
scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 and that it did not
contemplate that the amendment would conflict with § 101.191
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may modify existing
authorization statutes (or substantive statutes), such as § 101, by an
amendment to an appropriations bill. 19 2 However, the Court has
indicated that the doctrine disfavoring repeals by implication applies
with greater force when the claimed repeal rests on an appropriations
act.' 93 Indeed, the House Rules state that appropriations bills should
not change existing law.' 94 For a statute to be repealed by implication
by a subsequent Act of Congress, "the intention ... to repeal must be
clear and manifest."' 195 In evaluating the intention, courts look to both
legislative history and the traditional separation between
190. Id. at 636 n.137 (citing 149 CONG. REC. E2235 (statement ofRep. Weldon)).
191. One might argue that Congress's assumption that the foreclosure of patentability of
human organisms by the Weldon Amendment was consistent with § 101 indicates that § 101 did
not provide for the patentability of human organisms, despite the Supreme Court's interpretation
of it in Chakrabarty, abating the conflict discussed here. While this argument may have some
appeal, it is inconsistent with the precepts of statutory interpretation articulated by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)(quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). This
holds true despite the fact that misunderstanding of the original statute may have played some
part in the passage of the subsequent statute, as is the case with § 101 and the Weldon
Amendment. Id. at 349. The Court considers "subsequent history .. . less illuminating than
contemporaneous evidence." Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994). "Thus, even when it
would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable
interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its
enactment." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980); accord Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 626-27 (2004). The language of § 101 authorizes a
wide scope of patentable subject matter seemingly including anything made by man. See
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09, 314-16 (1980). Likewise, the contemporaneous
legislative history provides that "anything under the sun that is made by man" is patentable
under § 101. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); accord H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see
also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09. Given the broad, inclusive language of § 101 and the
unambiguous legislative history that § 101 rendered anything made by man patentable, a court
would not likely consider Congress's incorrect assumption that § 101 allowed for the exclusion
of human organisms from the realm of patentable subject matter at the time it passed the
Weldon Amendment to restrict the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 contrary to its
plain language and contemporaneous legislative history. Another argument undermining the
contention that § 101 excluded human organisms from the realm of patentable subject matter is
that if it did so, the Weldon Amendment would have been unnecessary and redundant.
192. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940).
193. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
194. See id. at 19 I.
195. See id. at 189. (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
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appropriations and authorization.' 96 Given the House Rule against
changes in existing law by appropriations measures and the fact that
Congress enacted the Weldon Amendment under an erroneous
interpretation of § 101 with no apparent intention to repeal or modify
it, even expressly indicating that the Weldon Amendment was not
intended to modify patent law, there is a convincing argument that
Congress did not express a clear and manifest intent to foreclose the
patentability of human organisms that were patentable subject matter
under § 101. In the absence of express intention to repeal, "the only
permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier
and later statutes are irreconcilable."' 97 The Weldon Amendment may
be interpreted not as foreclosing patentability of human organisms,
but as withdrawing federal subsidy for PTO analysis of applications
involving human organisms. Thus, the PTO might comply with the
amendment by charging higher fees for patent applications directed to
human subject matter, reflecting a lack of federal subsidy. Therefore,
the Weldon Amendment is not irreconcilable with § 101, indicating
that the amendment did not repeal § 101.
On the other hand, the legislative history of the Weldon
Amendment unmistakably evinces a clear congressional intent to
foreclose patentability of human organisms. 19' Furthermore, the
Weldon Amendment, addressing the patentability of human
organisms, is more specific than the extremely broad § 101 and thus
might overcome it given the principle of statutory construction "that a
more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general
one."' 99 However, while Congress intended to codify the PTO's
practice that human inventions were unpatentable, it neither
contemplated that the PTO's conclusion was inconsistent with § 101
as interpreted by the Supreme Court nor intended to repeal § 101 with
respect to human inventions. Furthermore, Congress has expressly
foreclosed patentability of inventions useful solely in connection with
certain nuclear materials and atomic weapons. 200 Rather than preclude
the use of federal funds for PTO processing of applications related to
196. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders,
1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 482.
197. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 190 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550
(1974)).
198. See, e.g., Kopinski, supra note 126, at 635-36 & n.137 (indicating that Congress
intended to bar patentability of human organisms in the Weldon Amendment).
199. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973)); accord Sullivan v. Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2007).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2000).
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these inventions, Congress explicitly stated that "[n]o patent shall...
be granted for [them]." 20 ' Thus, if Congress had wanted to expressly
proscribe patentability of human organisms, it certainly knew how to
do so.
Neither the Weldon Amendment nor the PTO's conclusion that
human inventions, such as chimeras considered human, fall outside
the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 have been
challenged in the courts. Indeed, the ability of the Weldon
Amendment to foreclose patentability of human inventions is a close
issue. Nonetheless, the above analysis suggests that a court would
likely find that Congress's intent to restrict patentability of human
organisms in enacting the Weldon Amendment, an appropriations act,
did not constitute the clear and manifest intent to repeal or modify §
101 as required by the Supreme Court and, accordingly, that the
Weldon Amendment does not wholly foreclose the patentability of
human organisms, including human-animal chimeras considered
human.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment Does Not Foreclose the
Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras or Human
Inventions
The fact that human-animal chimeras, including those qualifying
as human, and other forms of human inventions fall within the scope
of patentable subject matter articulated in § 101 does not necessarily
render them patentable. For instance, if patentability of human
inventions ran afoul of a constitutional provision, such as the
Thirteenth Amendment, as suggested by the PTO, it would not be
patentable although it fits within the statutory scope of patentable
subject matter .2" The PTO provided no explanation for this
conclusion. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and
involuntary servitude.20 3 As the amendment was enacted to eradicate
any remaining vestiges of slavery, the Supreme Court has interpreted
it to permit Congress to eliminate the "badges and incidents" and
"relic[s] of slavery. 20 4 The Court defined "badges of slavery" as the
"'burdens and disabilities' [associated with slavery] includ[ing]
restraints upon 'those fundamental rights which are the essence of
civil freedom, namely, the ... right[s] ... to inherit, purchase, lease,
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
204. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,440-43 (1968).
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sell and convey property.' 20 5 Impairments of autonomy give rise to
social inferiority and, at some point, may lead to subjugation.0 6
Despite the PTO's conclusion, the Thirteenth Amendment does not
proscribe patentability of chimeras considered human and other
human inventions, as the patentability of such inventions does not
appear to parallel slavery.
"[T]here is no reason to suppose that the Thirteenth Amendment
addresses the type of right [or monopoly] conferred by a patent." 20 7 A
patent merely confers the right to stop others from making, using, or
selling a patented invention. 20 A patent does not give the patentee an
affirmative right to practice or use the invention or even to possess a
physical embodiment of it.20 9 For instance, in the pharmaceutical
context, a patent holder must not make, use, or sell a patented drug
without approval from the FDA, and may not even possess her
patented pharmaceutical invention if it is contraband or it is
distributed only by prescription and she does not have a
prescription. 2 10 Further, while some states prohibit the use of radar
detectors, and these prohibitions apply equally to the inventors of
such radar detectors, courts have nevertheless found them
patentable.211 Thus, while the holder of a patent for a chimera
considered human or other human invention could prohibit others
from making, using, or selling such a creature, these rights do not
permit the patentee to impress the patented creature into bondage or
servitude or otherwise "own" the living creature itself. 212 Indeed, the
rights conferred to a patent holder do not encompass such control
over individual embodiments of the invention. Patent rights are
distinct from any given embodiment of an invention.213 A person can
buy, sell, or trade away patent rights without buying, selling, or
trading a physical embodiment of the patented invention. 214 Thus, as
patents do not confer possessory rights in the patented article, the
205. Id. at 441 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
206. See Kevin D. DeBr6, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or
Enslaving Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221, 230 (1989).
207. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1647-48 (1993).
208. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
209. See MUELLER, supra note 45, at 14; Burk, supra note 207, at 1648.
210. SeeBurk, supranote207, at 1641, 1648.
211. See Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1885-86 (N.D. Tex.
1988).
212. Burk, supra note 207, at 1648.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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intangible property rights that inhere in a patent as well as markets in
patent rights do not impinge on the autonomy of a patented human
creature itself.21 5 The patentee's exercise of his rights "to exclude
others from manufacturing, using or selling the human invention
would not by itself give rise to socially imposed inferiority" or "result
in subjugation of the [patented individual]. 216 A patentee's rights to a
human invention with a particular cellular or genetic constitution do
not engender the burdens and disabilities of slavery as they do not
interfere with such an individual's fundamental rights, such as the
right to own or dispose of property. Impairment of property rights is
the prototypic example of a badge of slavery.217 Therefore, the
patentee's rights conferred by a patent for a chimera considered
human or another type of human invention do not of themselves
constitute badges of slavery.2 18 Patentability of human inventions is
not a relic of slavery inasmuch as non-possessory rights conferred by
a patent do not press a patented individual directly into slavery or
bondage. Thus, patentability of chimeras considered human does not
run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment is only potentially applicable to
chimeras that are considered human. 219 It has no effect on the
patentability of chimeras that fall short of humanity even if a court
were to find that it foreclosed patentability of chimeras considered
215. See id.; DeBrd, supra note 206, at 232.
216. DeBrd, supra note 206, at 232.
217. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 22 (1883)).
218. See Burk, supra note 207, at 1648; DeBr6, supra note 206, at 232. Some
commentators have argued that the badges and incidents of slavery may arise from "genetic
bondage" occurring when genetic manipulation, of a human organism, such as generating a
human-animal chimera, gives rise to a sort of character determination. See DeBr6, supra note
206, at 230. Genetic bondage may involve genetically engineering a human creature that
possesses a disabling condition(s) infringing on its autonomy, such as low intelligence, or a
more subtle intrusion on autonomy, such as mass production of like human organisms leading to
an erosion of their sense of individuality. Id. While this argument has some merit, it stretches the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and, in particular, the terms "slavery" and "involuntary
servitude." Burk, supra note 207, at 1648. This argument is also inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. The Court has interpreted the
Thirteenth Amendment in light of its historical setting as directed toward eradicating the
condition and badges of slavery inflicted upon African-Americans. See, e.g., id. (collecting
cases). The Court does not recognize genetic determinism as a component of that history of
bondage. Id. at 1648-49. A broad reading of the Thirteenth Amendment that would encompass
genetic determinism could also lead to absurd and socially undesirable results, such as a
conclusion that individuals with a formative influence on children, such as parents and teachers,
are subjecting them to the badges of slavery. Id. at 1649.
219. See, e.g., Magnani, supra note 1, at 450.
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human and other human inventions. Just like the applicability of the
Weldon Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment's applicability
depends on the definition of humanity adopted by courts and cannot
be effectively and consistently applied until courts adopt a workable
definition, like the one suggested above.22 ° Several commentators
have suggested that courts apply a narrower standard for humanity in
the Thirteenth Amendment context than that suggested by the PTO
and restrict its potential applicability to organisms that are entirely
human, excluding all chimeras from its scope.22 However, such an
approach is unsatisfying because it forecloses Thirteenth Amendment
protections for chimeras with considerable human characteristics,
including those that would suffer psychic harm from the badges and
incidents of slavery, such as subjugation. 222
D. The Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right
to Privacy and Reproductive Autonomy Does Not Foreclose
Patentability of Human Animal Chimeras, Including Those
Considered Human
The Supreme Court has recognized that one aspect of the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is "a right of personal privacy" encompassing
reproductive freedom and autonomy. 223 Indeed, the Court considers
the decision whether or not to reproduce at the heart of this
substantive due process right. 224 Patenting human-animal chimeras
considered human and other human inventions might conflict with the
right of reproductive autonomy and freedom of the individual
patented human creature itself.225 A patent restricts the right of others
besides the patentee to reproduce the invention.2 26 Thus, some
commentators have suggested that a patented chimera or human
might violate the patentee's right to restrict others from
manufacturing it whenever it reproduced naturally.227 Accordingly,
this right might conflict with the patented human organism's right to
220. See supra Part ILA; Magnani, supra note 1, at 450.
221. See Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 19-20; See Magnani, supra note 1, at 450.
222. See supra Part II.A.
223. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977).
224. Id. at 685.
225. Burk, supra note 207, at 1649.
226. See MUELLER, supra note 45, at 14. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
227. See Burk, supra note 207, at 1649.
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reproductive autonomy. 228 While this position makes some intuitive
sense, it is untenable, especially in the chimera context. Foremost,
natural reproduction by chimeras will not produce chimeric offspring.
A human-animal chimera contains cells that are either entirely human
or entirely animal. There are no hybrid cells. Thus, a chimera will
produce gametes that are entirely human or entirely animal.229 As the
chimera cannot produce chimeric offspring, any offspring generated
by a patented chimera would not fall within the scope of the patent for
a chimera. 230 However, other forms of human inventions, such as
transgenic humans, may produce offspring that have the same
transgenic properties as the parent(s). Even in these cases, the right to
reproductive autonomy does not foreclose patentability. The fact that
the Constitution negates a patentee's exclusionary rights when a
patented human is made by the procreation of a patented individual as
to that individual does not render the patentee's remaining rights,
such as the right to prevent others from synthesizing the patented
human organism by genetic engineering, a nullity-"the entire fabric
of the patent grant need not be unraveled by clipping one thread.,
231
The reasoning presented here also defeats the related argument that a
patent's possible abrogation of a patented human organism's
reproductive rights constitutes a violation of Thirteenth Amendment
because its infringement on a fundamental right of the patented
organism represents a badge and incident of slavery.
228. The patentee's ability to control the reproduction of a self-replicating living invention
is called into question by the doctrine of patent exhaustion which provides that a patentee who
sells or transfers a patented article cannot restrain subsequent resale, transfer, or use of the
article. See id. at 1638-39 n.320, 1650 n.396. However, the doctrine of patent exhaustion does
not apply when the article embodying the invention is not sold by the patentee. See, e.g.,
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). No sale by the patentee to
the creature itself occurs when the patentee creates a human organism. However, the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition on slavery seemingly prohibits sale of a human organism. Thus, a court
might consider a patentee's act in creating a patented human organism a constructive sale to the
organism itself for the purposes of patent exhaustion.
229. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 10, at 1225-26.
230. In sexual reproduction involving two human-animal chimeras, it is theoretically
possible that a human sperm could fertilize an animal egg or vice versa. Even if such a
fertilization could lead to the development and birth of offspring, such offspring would be a
hybrid rather than a chimera because every cell would contain 50% animal and 50% human
genetic material whereas in chimeras, some cells contain only human genetic material and
others contain only animal genetic material.
231. Burk, supra note 207, at 1650.
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E. The Moral Utility Doctrine Does Not Foreclose the
Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras
In addition to prescribing the scope of patentable subject matter,
§ 101 requires that an invention be useful to be patentable. 232 Courts
require patentable inventions to possess practical or specific utility,
meaning some real world use.233 Early U.S. judicial decisions required
moral or beneficial utility, rendering inventions "injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society" unpatentable,2 34 but
the Federal Circuit has rejected these earlier decisions and considers
the modem standard for utility as excluding morality as a relevant
consideration in determining the patentability of an invention.2 35
Human-animal chimeras have practical or specific utility and are not
rendered unpatentable by notions of moral or beneficial utility.
1. Practical or Specific Utility
The substantive threshold for satisfying the utility requirement is
relatively low.23 6 "An invention is 'useful' . . . if it is capable of
providing some identifiable benefit. 23 7 Although an invention need
not have more than one use, that use must be credible to a person of
ordinary skill in the art.238 The Supreme Court requires that an
invention have substantial utility or a real world use.239 Use as a
research tool, or scientific curiosity, does not qualify as a substantial
use and thus does not satisfy the utility requirement.2 40 Under this
rule, an asserted use for "[b]asic research such as studying the
properties of the claimed product itself' fails to satisfy the utility
requirement. 24 1 Likewise, "inventions whose asserted utility requires
further research to identify or reasonably confirm" do not meet the
232. 35 U.S.C § 101 (2000) (mandating that patentable inventions be "new and useful,"
among other things).
233. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995); MUELLER, supra note 45, at
208.
234. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
235. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
236. See MUELLER, supra note 45, at 208.
237. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366; accord Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("To violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally
incapable of achieving a useful result.").
238. See, e.g., Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566; see also Rohrbaugh, supra note 47, at 388 & n.80
(collecting cases).
239. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
240. See id at 534-35.
241. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2107.01(1)(B)(A) (8th ed., rev. 6 2007).
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utility requirement.242 However, an invention inciting amusement in
the public possesses the requisite utility to be patentable. 243 The PTO
Utility Examination Guidelines state the standard in a similar manner
and require a "specific and substantial" utility and exclude "'throw-
away,' 'insubstantial,' or 'nonspecific' utilities, such as the use of a
complex invention as landfill, as a way of satisfying the utility
requirement. 244
Human-animal chimeras satisfy the utility requirement. Human-
animal chimeras could create a valuable new source for organ
transplantation, as human donors are in short supply.
2 45
Xenotransplantation of animal organs into humans has only achieved
limited success because humans often reject animal organs as
foreign.246 Chimeric organs more closely resemble human organs and
thus might not be rejected.247 Moreover, some chimeras might have
some wholly human organs, which would not pose the rejection risk
associated with animal or even chimeric organs. If an organ or organ
system developed entirely from one of the human cells used to make
the chimeric embryo, that organ or organ system will be entirely
human. Furthermore, despite the general rule that use as a research
tool is insufficient to meet the utility requirement, the PTO has
indicated that a use for "analyzing compounds" in a research or
laboratory environment constitutes a specifically identified substantial
utility and thus satisfies the utility requirement. 248 Thus, the inventor
of a human animal-chimera might assert a use for studying the effects
of drugs on humans as a given drug is likely to affect chimeras, and in
particular their human cells, in a manner more similar to the way it
242. Id. § 2107.01(I)(C).
243. Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1934) ("[A] device which may be used for
innocent amusement possesses utility."); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,523,741 (filed Aug. 19,
1994) (patenting a "Santa Claus detector" that is useful for "providing [children] reassurance
that [their] good behavior has ...been rewarded by Santa Claus" by "providing selective
illumination to signal the arrival of Santa Claus").
244. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). Such a
"throw away" use in the human-animal chimera context would be to claim a chimera to be used
as snake food. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 39, at 249 (using this example in the
transgenic animal context). This use is neither specific, because any animal of comparable size
could be used as snake food, nor substantial, because using a human-animal chimera, which
would be rare and expensive to produce and probably unethical to feed to animals, as snake food
is not a real world context of use. See id.
245. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 456.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 241, § 2107.01 (1)(C).
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affects humans than the way it affects animals.249 In addition, some
chimeras, such as Minotaurs, might be used for amusement purposes
in zoos and sideshows provided that the chimeras used did not qualify
as human under the Thirteenth Amendment.25 °
2. Moral Utility
Early U.S. judicial decisions recognized a morality component
within the utility requirement restricting utility to inventions with
"some beneficial use in society" and rendering unpatentable those that
were injurious to the well-being, good policy, sound morals, health, or
good order of society.251 Applying this standard, courts invalidated
patents on gambling devices and patents on inventions designed to be
deceptive in the early Twentieth Century. 252 However, the Federal
Circuit has noted that this principle has not been applied broadly in
recent years. 253 In 1977, the Board upheld the patentability of a slot
machine, reasoning that it could not find any basis in § 101 to hold
that gambling machines were unpatentable for want of utility,
although some consider gambling immoral and injurious to public
order.254 In 1999, the Federal Circuit held patentable an arguably
deceptive product designed to appear to be something it is not,
249. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 629-30; Magnani, supra note 1, at 456. While the
use of a human-animal chimera appears as a means of assessing the effects of drugs and/or other
compounds on humans likely satisfies the utility requirement, a use for investigating the
properties of the chimera itself, including its responsiveness to drugs, does not. See supra notes
238-39 and accompanying text.
250. Of course, the operator of such attractions could employ chimeras considered human
to appear in the attraction, much as carnival operators have employed people with physical
deformities. People might consider it unseemly to hold that such a human-animal chimera
classified as human is "useful" for amusement purposes. Furthermore, a chimera considered
human (or those charged as its guardians) cannot be forced to appear in an attraction for
amusement purposes. However, for an invention to be unpatentable for want of utility, it "must
be totally incapable of achieving a useful result." Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Thus, since a chimera considered human can choose
to partake in an attraction, it is not totally incapable of achieving the useful result of amusement.
Thus, such chimeras appear to meet the practical or specific utility requirement, although people
might be uneasy about the result. Likewise, a chimera considered human could not be impressed
as an organ donor or research subject without the type of consent required from humans, but
could choose to engage in such activities. Thus, the chimera is not totally incapable of achieving
a useful result in these contexts.
251. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); see Lowell v, Lewis, 15 F.
Cas 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
252. See, e.g., Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir.
1925). See Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512, 512-14 (7th Cir. 1922); see Rickard v. Du Bon,
103 F. 868, 871-73 (2d Cir. 1900).
253. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
254. Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802 (B.P.A.I. 1977).
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reasoning that cases invalidating patents on deceptive products on
moral utility grounds "do not ... represent[] the correct view of the
doctrine of utility." 255 Thus, although the Federal Circuit did not
expressly disclaim moral utility entirely, it suggested that the modem
standard of utility does not attempt to judge the morality of an
invention.256 The Court reasoned that the PTO is not the proper arbiter
of whether an invention is moral, deceptive, or illegal as this is the
realm of Congress and other agencies such as the FDA. 7 Congress is
free to declare classes of inventions unpatentable and has done so in
the case of inventions useful solely in connection with certain nuclear
258
materials and atomic weapons. Lower courts have held that radar
detectors, which are used only to circumvent the law, are
patentable.2 5 9 However, the moral utility doctrine is not completely
dead, as lower courts have recited it as the standard for utility without
applying it.
260
Given the vestigial nature of the moral utility doctrine, courts
will not likely apply it to defeat the patentability of human inventions
or human animal-chimeras. Even if a court contemplated applying the
moral utility doctrine, as discussed above, human-animal chimeras
have beneficial uses in society and thus have moral utility. However,
the moral objections to the patentability of human-animal chimeras
are far from trivial. Thus, if the moral utility doctrine has survived at
all, human-animal chimeras, especially those considered human, are a
context where a court might apply it. However, moral arguments
against the patentability of human-animal chimeras are neither airtight
nor decisive as there are weighty arguments on the other side of the
ledger.
The primary ethical objections to the development and creation
of human-animal chimeras are deontological.2 6t  Some oppose
human-animal chimera research on the basis that human-animal
chimeras are made from human embryos as they contend that human
255. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367.
256. See id.; MUELLER, supra note 45, at 208.
257. See Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1368.
258. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000)).
259. See Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885,1886 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
260. See Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 213 F. Supp. 2d 597, 610 (E.D.
Va. 2002).
261. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 629. There are numerous general policy objections
to patenting living things such as animals that could equally apply to chimeras. However, these
objections were rejected by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty. See supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text. Thus, this discussion focuses on policy arguments specific to the chimera
context.
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embryos are to be afforded a special dignity that is offended by their
use in any kind of experimentation, much more commingling cells
taken from them with cells from animal embryos.262 This reasoning
provides the basis for precluding patentability of human-animal
chimeras under European Union rules.263 However, giving embryos
legal status in the patent context is inconsistent with the established
right to an abortion, as patenting is a far lesser affront to the integrity
of the embryo than an abortion is. Thus, given the weak legal position
of embryos in the abortion context and the lack of consensus on this
issue in society, a court would be unlikely to give significant weight
to this objection.264
A related objection is that the human species, and animal species
as well, have a right to their uniqueness and not to be corrupted by the
265formation of chimeras. However, a court might consider this
objection specious as it is difficult to say that species have rights
because they are not static, but rather are constantly evolving, and
breeding is routinely used to alter species. 266 Some also object to
chimera research because they feel that the commingling of human
embryos with animal embryos, potentially conferring human
characteristics on animals, offends the dignity of humanity.267 Thus,
creating creatures that are partially human is morally wrong.
Furthermore, some have advanced a religious objection to chimera
research on the ground that the creation of new types of animals by
man that do not occur in nature is encroaching on a domain that is
reserved for God.268 Finally, although it might seem like farfetched
science fiction, human-animal chimeras, which combine human
brains and central nervous systems that confer human reasoning
abilities, with the bodies of animals possessing certain physical
capabilities greater than humans, such as apes or lions, could create
grave danger to humanity as superhuman warriors in combat fighting
alongside humans or if they turned on the humans that created them
and sought to establish chimeric hegemony on the Earth.269 While
262. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 629; Magnani, supra note 1, at 457.
263. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 457.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 457-58.
267. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 629.
268. See Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 31.
269. Fortunately, such chimeric creatures would be unable to naturally reproduce as
chimeras. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text. However, chimeras with human
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these objections are not without merit, the beneficial uses of human-
animal chimeras likely outweigh them.270 In addition to their use in
organ transplantation, as discussed above, human-animal chimeras
have valuable uses in studying the effects of drugs on humans.271
272They are also useful as models for human embryonic development.
A final moral objection to human-animal chimeras is that
construction of chimeras and research involving them may result in
needless animal suffering. 273 This argument is disputable because a
human-animal chimera would suffer no more than other animals used
in research, patented or otherwise.2 74 However, the suffering of a
human-animal chimera, especially one considered human, would be
weighed more heavily than that of an animal. 275 A retort is that any
suffering incurred by chimeras and the increased opprobrium
associated with chimera, as opposed to animal, research "would be
offset by the increased value of using chimeras, rather than animals,
in research ... designed to benefit humanity." 276  Although it is
strictly regulated, human research is a staple of medical science.
Thus, the possibility of the suffering of chimeras, including those
considered human, in research endeavors is not a reason to remove
incentives for scientists to engage in chimera research by withholding
277patent protection.
reasoning ability could conceivably generate other chimeras themselves using the chimera
technology used by humans to originally create them.
270. See Kopinski, supra note 126, at 629.
271. See id at 629-30; Magnani, supra note 1, at 456; supra note 247 and accompanying
text. Although a court would likely find that use of a chimera for investigation of the effects of
drugs on humans satisfies the utility requirement, see supra notes 246-47 and accompanying
text, pure use of an invention like a human animal-chimera as a research tool, such as to
discover its properties and characteristics, is insufficient to confer practical utility on an
invention, see supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. However, the character of such uses
is germane in evaluation of the morality of an invention and thus figures into analysis of moral
utility.
272. See Magnani, supra note 1, at 455.




277. The argument that the moral utility doctrine should be resurrected in the human-
animal chimera context is strongest in regard to human-animal chimeras that qualify as human.
Indeed, any moral uneasiness about permitting the inventor of a human-animal chimera to
obtain intellectual property rights in it is heightened when the chimera is considered human.
However, even human-animal chimeras that are considered human have some beneficial uses to
society and thus meet the standard for moral utility. See supra note 248. Furthermore, as
discussed above, rewarding the inventor of a human-animal chimera legally constituting a
human being does not infringe on the rights that the Constitution affords human beings under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments possessed by such a chimera. See supra Part II(C)-
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F. Human-Animal Chimeras Meet the Patent Law's Novelty
Requirement
The novelty provisions of the patent law are conveyed in 35
U.S.C. § 102.278 Under § 102, an invention is not patentable if "the
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country" or if
"the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it" before the patentee
invented it.279 Human-animal chimeras do not appear in nature and
are entirely created by man. Thus, if a human-animal chimera has not
been previously described by other researchers and was first created
by a patent applicant, the patent law's novelty provisions do not
foreclose its patentability.
G. Human-Animal Chimeras Meet the Patent Law's
Nonobviousness Requirement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), an invention is not patentable,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter
pertains.
280
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,281 the Supreme Court provided
analytical guidance for determining the issue of nonobviousness
under § 103.282 The Court articulated four criteria to be weighed in
analyzing nonobviousness: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; (3)
the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations
that are objective indicia of nonobviousness including commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others. 283 The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this framework in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.284 In assessing the obviousness of an
(D). Thus, a court would not likely find that allowing patent rights for the inventor of such a
chimera would violate the moral utility doctrine on the grounds of infringement on the rights of
the chimeric creature itself.
278. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
279. § 102(a), (g)(2).
280. § 103(a).
281. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
282. Id. at 17-18; accord KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
283. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18; accordKSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
284. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
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invention, the prior art references are combined, and the entire prior
art is compared to the invention as a whole.285 Thus, while a single
reference is required to anticipate an invention, the combination of
multiple prior art references can render an invention obvious,
although no single one of them does. In combining prior art
references, a court must be careful to "avoid aggregating pieces of
prior art through hindsight which would not have been combined
absent the inventor['s] insight., 286 The obviousness inquiry is highly
fact specific, making formulation of specific rules difficult.
287
However, in this nonobviousness analysis, the Federal Circuit
considers two factors:
(1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary
skill in the art that they should make the claimed composition or
device ... and (2) whether the prior art would also have revealed
that in so making or carrying out, those of ordinary skill would
have a reasonable expectation of success.
288
When the prior art suggests that an invention should be made
and/or suggests the use of a technique to make an invention, but does
not convey to those of ordinary skill a reasonable expectation that the
invention could be made by suggesting how to create the invention
using the technique and providing evidence that this could be
accomplished successfully, the invention is not obvious. 289 Thus, both
factors must be fulfilled to render an invention unpatentable as
285. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 & n.6
(Fed. Cir. 1986); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 516 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(decided after KSR) ("[T]he claimed invention as a whole must be compared to the prior art as a
whole.").
286. McNeil-PPC, 516 F. Supp. at 248 (following KSR); see also KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742;
Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; L & A Prods., Inc. v. Britt Tech Corp., 365 F.2d 83, 87 (8th Cir. 1966);
ef Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
287. See In re Brouwer, 77 F.3d 422, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1996); cf KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
288. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing In re Dow Chem. Co., 837
F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is
whether the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process
should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in light of the
prior art.")); see Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("To make [the obviousness] determination, the Court must assess, without the benefit of
hindsight, whether the prior art would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that
the invention should be made and that it would have a 'reasonable likelihood of success."')
(quoting Dow, 837 F.2d at 473).
289. See Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 (holding an invention nonobvious when the prior art
suggested it but "dlid] not suggest how that end might be accomplished"); Rohrbaugh, supra
note 47, at 409-10.
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obvious; prior art only satisfying the first one is insufficient "as it
serves merely as an invitation to try to create the invention.,
290
290. Ryan Hagglund, Patentability of Cloned Extinct Animals, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
381, 422 (2008); Rohrbaugh, supra note 47, at 409-10 (citing Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380).
Nothing in the Supreme Court's KSR opinion alters this analysis. Hagglund, supra note 290, at
422 n.279; cf Sanofi-Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (applying this analysis after KSR was
decided). In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's "teaching, suggestion or
motivation test," under which a claimed invention was nonobvious in the face of a combination
of prior art references unless "some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings
can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having
ordinary skill in the art." 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
1739, 1741. Therefore, "even in the absence of a suggestion that prior art teachings should be
combined, the combination is not necessarily nonobvious." Hagglund, supra note 290, at 422
n.279. Nothing in KSR suggested that it modified or in any way repudiated the Federal Circuit's
analysis of obviousness in situations beyond the combination of elements in the prior art. Id. The
analysis articulated in the cases cited in this discussion does not involve whether the prior art
suggested or taught that prior art references be combined but rather "whether there was a
suggestion in the prior art that the invention should be made and whether the prior art revealed
that one making it would have a reasonable expectation of success." Id. Indeed, after KSR was
decided, a district court applied the analysis discussed here in determining whether an invention
was obvious, and quoted Dow for the proposition that the obviousness inquiry turned on
"whether the prior art would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the
invention should be made and that it would have a 'reasonable likelihood of success."' Sanofi-
Synthelabo, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (quoting Dow, 837 F.2d at 473).
Although the KSR Court did state that it was error to conclude that a patent claim cannot be
proved obvious merely by showing that a combination of prior art elements was obvious to try,
127 S. Ct. at 1742, the Court in no way indicated that this pronouncement applied outside of the
situation where a person of ordinary skill in the art achieves anticipated success as a result of
pursuing known options from a finite universe of particular solutions, Hagglund, supra note
290, at 422-23 n.279. The Court noted that the fact that a combination was obvious to try might
render it obvious under circumstances where a person of ordinary skill in the art pursues known
options from a finite universe of identified predictable solutions to a problem, for which there
was a design need or market pressure for a solution, and achieves anticipated success reasoning
that it is likely that such actions are the product of ordinary skill and common sense as opposed
to innovation. 127 S. Ct. at 1742. Therefore, "KSR does not prescribe that the fact that it was
obvious to try a combination is sufficient to render it obvious when the combination is not a
known option drawn from a finite universe of predictable solutions or its success is surprising
rather than anticipated." Hagglund, supra note 290, at 422 n.279.
Indeed, "[i]n the run-of-the-mine case, a suggestion to build an invention is insufficient to
render the invention obvious because it is merely an invitation to construct the invention, but
does not create a reasonable expectation of doing so." Id. Also, such a suggestion "provides no
evidence that the invention can be constructed successfully and thus is defective." Id. (citing
Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380; Rohrbaugh, supra note 47, at 409-10). Accordingly, "[a]
suggestion to try is insufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to construct the
invention." Hagglund, supra note 290, at 422 n.279. This stands in contrast to "the situation
contemplated by KSR, where the prior art or common sense suggests a combination and a person
of ordinary skill in the art pursues known options from a finite universe of identified predictable
solutions to achieve anticipated success in addressing a known problem." Id. In this context,
"the suggestion to try the combination [itself] is enabling because the suggestion alone allows
the inventor to create the invention by using common sense and ordinary skill without
innovation." Id. Therefore, even if the KSR Court's pronouncement that an invitation to try to
construct an invention might be sufficient to render the invention obvious under some
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In the human-animal chimera context, a court would likely
consider the relevant prior art to include animal chimeras and human-
animal chimeras that have already been synthesized and the
techniques used to synthesize them. In the xenotransplantation
context, the prior art would include the current state of
xenotransplantation and transplantation technologies.
Under this standard, the synthesis of some types of chimeras,
those created by xenotransplantation, for instance, are likely obvious.
A court would likely consider the prior art to have suggested to those
of ordinary skill in the art that they use xenotransplantation.
Xenotransplantation has been used in many situations where a human
transplant is not available or practicable. 29 1 Also, the prior art would
likely reveal that an attempted xenotransplantation would have a
likelihood of success. Scientists and physicians have a relatively good
understanding of when xenotransplantation is appropriate and when a
human patient may reject an animal transplant.2 92  Furthermore,
although research involving surgical techniques is not regulated to the
same degree as other forms of medical research such as testing of
experimental drugs, an ethical surgeon would not attempt a
xenotransplantation procedure on a human patient unless the surgeon
believed that there was some likelihood of success. 293 However,
nonobviousness calls for a very case-specific analysis. One might
envision a xenotransplant, such as transplanting an animal heart or
liver into a human, that would not be obvious if perfected because the
prior art would not provide evidence of success.
2 94
circumstances "were held to apply beyond the combination of prior art context, this rule would
not alter the analysis in situations, such as the [human-animal chimera] context, where the mere
suggestion to build an invention does not enable one skilled in the art to construct the invention
without further innovation." Id.; see infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
291. See Stankovi6, supra note 19, at 6-8.
292. See id.; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
293. See Vicki Brower, The Ethics of Innovation, 4 EMBO REP. 338 (2003).
294. One is naturally uneasy about patenting a human transplant patient, even one who has
received an animal xenotransplant. Such a patient is human by any standard employed. See
supra Part II.A. However, a xenotransplant patient constitutes a chimera that does not occur in
nature. Thus, a xenotransplant patient appears to be patentable subject matter. As discussed
above, such a patent would not infringe on the individual's autonomy and would only preclude
others from engaging in the same transplant technique. However, such a patent would be of
limited value because Congress excludes health care practitioners and health care facilities from
liability for infringement when they infringe patents while engaging in medical activity. See 35
U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000). Medical activity is defined as "performance of a medical or surgical
procedure on a body." § 287(c)(2)(A). Thus, an individual who patents a xenotransplant patient
would never be able to recover damages for infringement because a surgical transplant is clearly
a medical or surgical procedure on a body. However, § 287(c) does not foreclose infringement
of a patent on a human-animal chimera created by modem molecular biological methods such as
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In contrast, a court would likely find that a human-animal
chimera created using molecular biological methods not hitherto
described, is not obvious. One might argue that previous chimeras
would render future chimeras obvious. Indeed, a court would
probably consider the prior art to have suggested to a person with
ordinary skill in the art to create a human-animal chimera. Numerous
chimeric animals and human-animal chimeras have been created and
numerous prior art references suggest avenues of research that
chimeras may be used in. However, this is not sufficient to render a
embryo fusion. The term "body" is defined as a "body, organ, or cadaver" of human or
nonhuman animal used for research purposes. § 287(c)(2)(E). Procedures creating chimeras
from embryos and probably fetuses as well do not involve bodies, organs, or cadavers. Although
one might argue that a body includes an embryo, an embryo cannot fairly be said to have a
body.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a xenotransplant patient is a chimera that does not
exist but for the intervention of man inasmuch as a xenotransplant patient is a human being
which has at least one animal organ. However, man's application of labor to a natural article,
such as a human being or animal, is not sufficient to render it patentable subject matter. See Am.
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 12 (1931). Under the product of nature doctrine,
which excludes products of nature from the realm of patentable subject matter, for an invention
derived from nature to be patentable, the inventor's work must result in a transformation giving
rise to a "new and different article ... having a distinctive name, character, or use." Id. at 13
(internal quotation omitted); see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). Thus,
although cotton cannot be cleaned and ginned without the handiwork of man, the cleaned and
ginned cotton is not patentable. See Am. Fruit, 283 U.S. at 12. A court would probably find that
a xenotransplant patient containing animal vital organs, at least the types of organs that would
render the xenotransplant nonobvious, met this standard. Such a xenotransplant patient would
still be called "human" and thus would have the same name as natural humans and presumably
would not have additional abilities and thus would have the same "uses." However, a
xenotransplant patient has "characteristics different from those given by nature" inasmuch as it
contains animal organs, which are different from any organs that naturally occur in humans.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928). Furthermore, animal
organs may have different sizes than human organs and might have important physiologic
differences. Thus, a xenotransplant patient has a distinctive character from natural humans and
animals as it is a human being that contains an organ of a different species.
One might attempt to take this argument to an absurd conclusion and argue that a normal
transplant patient who received a human transplant is patentable subject matter because humans
do not contain organs from other individuals save for the intervention of man. The product of
nature doctrine proscribes the patentability of such transplant patients. Unlike xenotransplant
patients, normal transplant patients have the same characteristics and properties as natural
humans. Indeed, a normal transplant patient's transplanted organ is a human organ, identical to
those that appear in natural humans. Even though a transplant patient contains an organ derived
from another individual, that organ is a normal human organ and has the properties of one. Such
a transplant patient does not contain an organ that does not naturally occur in humans.
Manufacture of an article that is a product of nature by humans independent of nature or repair
of a naturally-occurring article by the hand of man does not render the article patentable because
it does appear in nature. Thus as humans exist in nature and transplanting a human organ from
one human into another does not give the recipient characteristics other than those of a natural
human or the transplanted organ different properties, a normal transplant patient constitutes a
product of nature and cannot be subject to a product patent.
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given human-animal chimera obvious.2 95 Specific difficulties may
attend the creation of specific chimeras such that knowledge of
previous chimeras will not suggest that the desired chimera will be
created successfully. Successful creation of one human-animal
chimera does not create a reasonable expectation that a different
chimera can be successfully created using the same technique.
Scientists find the results unpredictable when adopting molecular
biological techniques involving embryos, such as cloning and embryo
fusion to create chimeras, from one species to another.2 96 For
instance, the fact that a chimera can be created between humans and
one animal does not mean that a chimera can be created containing
cells of humans and a different animal. This suggests that a human-
animal chimera with a new species is not obvious. Certain chimeras
may be difficult to create. An example is a mouse with an entirely
human brain. In this situation, difficulties may arise because a mouse
has a smaller cranial cavity than a human, and a human brain may not
develop properly in it. Furthermore, the embryo fusion method used
to create the "geep" has never been used to create a true human-
animal chimera that was allowed to develop to birth. Researchers
have encountered problems in human cloning experiments that they
have not observed with other species, including the termination of
development of cloned human embryos in vitro at an early stage.297 If
allowed to develop further, the same problem might be encountered
with chimeric embryos containing human cells. These problems make
it unlikely that a court would find that the prior art involving the
previous synthesis of human-animal chimeras engendered a
reasonable expectation of success in a researcher attempting to create
a human-animal chimera that has not been hitherto created.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of patentability involves many fact-specific factors that
could not reasonably be considered in this article. However, the above
analysis indicates that at least some human-animal chimeras may be
patentable under some circumstances. The purpose of the patent
system is to induce the discovery of new inventions by granting
inventors the right to exclude others from making, selling, or using
295. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
296. See Rohrbaugh, supra note 47, at 411.
297. See, e.g., Jose B. Cibelli, et al., The First Human Cloned Embryo, Sca. AM., Nov. 24,
2001.
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the invention for a limited period of time.298 Those who raise ethical
objections to human-animal chimeras argue that the patent system
should not encourage the creation of such potentially unethical
inventions. However, the above analysis reveals that, under the
current state of the patent law, at least some human-animal chimeras
may be patented. As the Supreme Court concluded in Chakrabarty,
policy arguments raised against the patentability of living things, such
as human-animal chimeras, are best addressed by Congress and that
courts should not foreclose the patentability of inventions that are
included within the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 on
such grounds.
299
Courts consider living things, including plants, animals, and
microorganisms, patentable subject matter so long as they are created
by man and do not occur in nature. 300 Human-animal chimeras that do
not rise to the level of humanity constitute patentable subject matter
as they are wholly manmade living things that do not occur in nature
and could not exist but for the intervention of man. However, as
discussed above, the language of the Supreme Court in holding living
things patentable, indicating that anything made by man is patentable
subject matter, brings human-animal chimeras considered human and
entirely human inventions into the scope of patentable subject matter
under § 101.301 However, the question of patentability of a chimera
considered human, just like a wholly human invention, is complicated
in several respects. First, Congress has enacted the Weldon
Amendment and its progeny in appropriations bills proscribing the
use of federal funds by the PTO to issue patents on human organisms.
Second, humanity triggers Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights which give a creature autonomy rights and curtail the ability of
others to assert property rights over it. However, neither the Weldon
Amendment nor any constitutional source provides a definition of
humanity despite the obvious importance of one in the chimera
context. The preferable definition best reflecting moral and
intuitional, as well as biological, conceptions of humanity classifies
an organism as human if it is characterized by higher faculties and
physical characteristics associated with human beings to a significant
degree.
298. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 137 (3d Cir.
1980).
299. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980).
300. See supra, Part I.B-C and cases cited therein.
301. See supra Part II.B. 1.
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However, careful analysis of the patent law and the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment indicates that despite the uneasiness
associated with the patentability of chimeras that are considered
human and wholly human inventions, a court would likely hold that
Congress did not intend to create a conflict with § 101's broad scope
of patentable subject matter when it enacted the Weldon Amendment
and, accordingly, that the Amendment did not completely foreclose
patentability of human inventions and that a patent for a human
invention does not run afoul of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Although the state of chimera technology has not
developed to the point where the creation of mythological part-human
monsters that physically resemble human beings and would be
considered human, such as the Minotaur, is a reality; it is possible, if
not likely, that the technology will eventually reach such a point. If
Congress wishes to effectively prevent tinkerers in the realm of the
unnatural from obtaining patent protection for such creatures, it must
do what it has failed to do several times and enact an explicit
restriction on the patentability of human organisms (or human-animal
chimeras) as it has done for certain nuclear materials and nuclear
weapons.
